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Governance and Economic Growth in Developing Economies: 
A Comparative Study 
Abstract 
In the light of growing interest in the relationship between governance and economic 
growth, this research uses pooled cross-country times series for the time span 2002-2014 
to investigate the impacts of governance and other growth determinants on economic 
growth of low-income, lower-middle income, and upper-middle income economies. This 
paper contributes to the literature on governance, economic development indicators, and 
economic development in novel ways. The research finds that governance is highly 
positively associated with economic development in developing countries regardless of 
their level of income. Moreover, while the research concludes that voice and 
accountability, political stability, and rule of law are positively and significantly related to 
economic development of Low Income economies, it suggests that political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption make a great deal 
to economic development of Lower Middle-Income countries. It also indicates that voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law are highly 
positively correlated with economic growth of Upper Middle-Income Economies. 
However, the results might contradict with other studies if other researchers include in 
their sample countries from different income groups. Therefore, the policy 
recommendations should be used cautiously 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Economic growth is essential to economic development. A country' s  population benefits 
when the country' s  national income grows . Since there is no magic formula for countries 
to spur their economic growth and become developed countries, the need for using a 
country ' s  resources more efficiently and rationally has become crucial today . To do so, one 
of the most important things a country should have is the "ability to put in place an 
institutional environment in which contracts can be enforced and property rights can be 
established" (Kadhim, 2013) .  Moreover, Douglass North states in the introduction of his 
1 990 book that " institutions affect the performance of economies is hardly controversial . "  
We therefore can say that the quality o f  governance plays a maj or role i n  maintaining a 
sustainable economic growth of a country. 
Governance is a broad notion. Etymologically, the word governance came from the Greek 
verb "Kubernan" (steer a ship or a tank. )  It was used for the first time by Plato 
metaphorically to denote the fact of governing people which gave birth to the Latin verb 
"Gubernare" from which many terms have been generated in multiple languages .  For 
instance, in French language, the terms "gouverner", "gouvernement", and "gouvernance" 
are generated from the Latin term. The term of old French "gouvernance" was first used in 
the thirteenth century as the equivalent of "gouvernement" (art or manner of governing) 
and then, from 1 478 ,  to designate some northern areas of France that had a special 
administrative status .  It passed into the English language in the fourteenth century, giving 
rise to the term governance (action or manner of governing) . The English term governance 
1 
was introduced to the economic literature in l 990 ' s  by the Anglo-Saxon economists and 
political scientists and international institutions (UN, World Bank and IMF in particular), 
again to designate the "art or manner of governing" ,  but with two additional concerns ; first, 
it gave a clear distinction with the government as an institution; secondly, it promoted a 
new mode of governance based on the participation of civil society at all levels (Huynh­
Quan-Suu, 2005). 
The concept of governance has many definitions provided by different scholars and 
organizations . According to Kaufman et al . the concept can be defined as "the traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised ." This includes not only how 
the governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the government' s  ability to 
effectively form and execute sound policies; as well as the respect of the state and residents 
for the institutions that rule economic and social interactions among them (World Bank, 
WB) . Scholars and policymakers have been focusing on a new notion known as "good 
governance ." "Good governance is ,  among other things,  participatory, transparent and 
accountable.  It is also effective, equitable, and it promotes the rule of law. Good 
governance ensures that political , social ,  and economic priorities are based on broad 
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard 
in decision-making over the allocation of development resources" (UNDP, 1997.) 
A growing consensus among scholars, policymakers, civil society groups, and aid donors 
has emerged emphasizing that governance matters to development and thereby to economic 
growth. This consensus has become more visible as a result of numerous empirical 
investigations that have taken place in the last decade showing vigorous positive effects of 
good governance (WB, 2008) . Thereby the significance of governance to the economic 
2 
growth of a country has become almost axiomatic (Kadhim, 2013) .  Governance has to be 
an indispensable part of a country ' s  strategy because of the very important role it plays in 
maintaining a sustainable growth rate . 
In a large number of developing countries, public institutions are overwhelmingly ruled by 
authoritarian and corrupt leaders, which make these institutions the root of countless 
economic, political , and social problems. Within developing countries ,  governance 
systems are not well prepared to deal in a global market without losing control over short­
term capital inflows that can destabilize them. The similarities of problems and issues of 
governance in these countries are remarkable. To overcome these issues, developing 
countries must recognize the very important role played by effective governance, i . e .  
enforcing contracts and establishing propriety rights, in  promoting economic development 
and knowing that without effective governance a country may lose control over the 
direction of its own economy (Jreisat, 2002 .) 
Most of the developing are ranked well below the global average in terms of the quality of 
governance .  In 20 1 4  and for the control of corruption indicator, 99 out of 1 3 5 developing 
countries ranked below the 5oth percentile, 49 of which ranked below the 25th percentile 
and 1 1 2 countries were given a negative governance score . For the government 
effectiveness metric,  1 09 developing states had a negative governance score and 99 were 
below the 5oth percentile, 50 of which ranked below the 25th percentile . For the political 
stability indicator, 95 developing nations were ranked below the 5oth percentile, 48 of 
which ranked below the 25 th percentile and 90 countries were given a negative governance 
score . For the regulatory quality indicator, 1 04 states of the region got a negative 
governance score and the rank of 97 countries were lower than the 50th percentile, 48 of 
3 
which ranked below the 25th percentile .  For the rule of law metric,  98  states were ranked 
below the 5oth percentile, 48 of which were given a rank below the 25th percentile and 1 1 2 
had a negative governance score . Finally, for the voice and accountability indicator, 8 8  
countries were given a negative governance score and 89  countries ranked below the 50th 
percentile, 43 of which were below the 25th percentile .  
The main focus of this study is to investigate the relationship between the overall 
governance and the economic growth of developing countries .  That is ,  this research aims 
to examine to what extent the indicators of rule of law, political stability, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness 
j ointly affect the economic growth in developing countries in the long term. Each of the 
governance indicators has its own significance. However, within developing countries 
where many governance issues already exist, this research endeavors to empirically assist 
policymakers and to suggest policies that might improve the institutional quality of 
developing nations so as to maintain a sustainable growth rate . As a general perception, 
given that good governance exists economic growth will be one of the results .  The 
secondary obj ective of this study is to explore the impacts of some highly debated variables 
such as government expenditure, FDI, inflation, trade openness .  Finally, we conclude this 
research by studying the different channels through which governance may affect 
economic development. 
1 . 1  Importance of the Study 
Many researchers consider the effects of governance on economic growth in the long-run 
of a country using different methodologies and data sets .  The findings are contradictory. 
On the one hand, some of them find that the association between these two variables is 
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positive . On the other hand, some of them argue that governance has an adverse effect on 
long-term economic development. Remarkably, there is another group of academics who 
contend that these two variables are not associated. In view of these differing results , this 
study examines for the effects of governance on economic growth in the long-run across 
countries and suggest policies that might enhance the long-term economic development of 
a country . 
1 .2 Research Questions 
• Test whether governance affects economic growth in the long run, 
• Identify the channels through which governance affects economic growth, 
• Determine which one of the indicators affects the growth the most for each 
income level, 
• Identify some other growth determinant that affect economic development 
across countries, and 
• Suggest policies that may help countries to enhance their economic growth 
in the long-term. 
The outline of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 displays the review of related studies on 
governance and economic growth and governance endogeneity. Chapter 3 explains the data 
and the theoretical framework. The methodology, estimation, and preposition are described 
in Chapter 4. Section 5 presents the data and summary statistics . The results and economics 
insights are displayed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the study and suggests 
some policies and recommendations as well as acknowledges the limitations of the study 
and presents some suggestions for future studies .  
5 
Chapter Two 
Literature review and Governance Endogeneity 
2.1 Literature Review 
Good governance has recently been seen as one of the most important factors to achieve a 
sustainable growth and thereby development. A large academic literature has developed 
models to cast light on how governance affect economic growth. Most of these studies have 
shown that good governance and economic growth are strongly positively correlated. One 
of such researches, where Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton ( 1999) studied more 
than 1 50 countries, provides empirical evidence that good governance matters a great deal 
for economic outcomes.  Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) conducted another study of 1 75 
countries for the period 2000/0 1 ,  asserting that good governance is necessary for high per 
capita income and economic development. The same result was concluded by Knack 
(2002.) It is worth mentioning that Kaufmann (with other authors) has examined the impact 
of governance on economic outcomes in many studies,  all of which come to the same 
conclusion stated above ( i .e .  Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010 ;  Kaufmann, Kraay 
& Mastruzzi, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi, 2007) 
Moreover, the results of a study by Calderoan and Chong (2000) have confirmed that 
there is strong causality from institutional quality to economic growth. The authors' results 
have also shown that economic growth causes institutional quality. Although their findings 
indicate that policies which attempt to improve the state' s institutional quality by securing 
propriety rights, controlling corruption, and limiting uncertainty need considerable time to 
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achieve the desired goal, these policies are important for economic growth. In addition, 
such a study has shown that institutional reforms have high influence on economic growth 
especially for the very poor countries .  Furthermore, by answering the question : why do 
some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? The results of Hall 
and Jones ( 1 998) have revealed that a country' s  long run productivity, capital 
accumulation, and thereby productivity per worker are influenced the most by institutions 
and government policies .  
Huynh and Jacho-Chavez (2009) have used a nonparametric method to analyze the 
relationship between governance and growth. Their findings indicate that three of the six 
indicators of governance : voice and accountability, political stability, and rule of law are 
economically and statistically significant while regulatory control, control of corruption, 
and government effectiveness are insignificant. The authors state that their empirical 
results support the findings of Glaeser, La Porta, de Silva, and Shleifer (2004) that poor 
countries get out of poverty and grow through good policies pursued by a dictator. 
The study by Han et al (2014) determines whether countries with below average 
governance grow slower than countries with above average governance .  Their results show 
that government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory 
quality are more significantly positively correlated with economic growth than rule of law 
and voice and accountability. The results also indicate that the studied Asian countries 
above average governance grow faster than those with below average governance .  
In sharing his  ideas on governance with World Bank economists, Rodrik (2008) argues 
that governance is an important tool for development .  He suggests that it is a good 
instrument to achieve better economic outcomes and enhance a country' s  policy making. 
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Rodrik also distinguishes between governance as a means and as an end. The author advises 
economists not to try to address governance as an end because it is political scientists ' task. 
For governance as a means, however, he argues that only countries having governance as 
binding constraint can give a governance reform the priority to boost their economic 
growth. 
Emara and Jhonsa (2014) used the Two-Stage Least Square method for a cross-sectional 
dataset of 1 97 countries to investigate the interrelationship between the improvement in 
the quality of governance and the increase in per capita income. Their findings show that 
there is a strongly positive and statistically significant causation from the quality of 
governance to per capita income. The results also prove a positive causation in the opposite 
direction. The authors used their results to interpret the relationship between the studied 
variables for 22 MENA countries .  They contend that one of their surprising results is that 
even though most of the studied MENA countries had low performance on all six indicators 
of governance, these MENA countries '  income per capita is relatively higher than the rest 
of the countries in the sample. 
Using the PRASH Model , Campos and Nugent (2000) analyzed the relationship between 
the growth volatility and political stability of Argentina over the period of 1 896-2000. The 
authors ' findings suggest that "informal" political instability, such as assassinations, 
directly and negatively affect economic growth. However, "formal" political instability 
affects economic growth indirectly. 
Alesina et al (1996) also studied the effects of political instability on per capita GDP 
growth of a sample of 1 1 3 countries over the period 1 950- 1 982 .  The major result of their 
paper is that political instability has negative effects on economic growth. That is ,  political 
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instability lessens the growth. Moreover, their results suggest that regime changes affect 
growth adversely. The same findings were reported by Feng's (1997) study. Using the 
three stages least-squares estimation for data covering 96 countries covering the period of 
1 960-80,  the author' s findings demonstrated that political instability has significant and 
negative effects on economic growth. 
Another study was done by Aisen and Veiga (20 1 3) to determine the impact of political 
instability on the growth. The authors used the system-GMM estimator for l inear dynamic 
panel data models on a sample covering 1 69 countries for the period of 1 960-2004 . Their 
results have proved that political instability and lower GDP per capita are strongly 
associated. Political instability has negative effects on economic growth by reducing the 
rates of productivity growth, and lowering capital and human accumulation. 
Morita and Zaelke (2007) have studied the link between the rule of law, good governance, 
and economic development. The authors argue that rule of law and good governance are 
important to achieve sustainable development. They also emphasize that good governance 
and sustainable development goals will not be achieved just by making laws and 
regulations, rather by enforcing those regulations and laws by governments. 
Dam (2006) reviewed the relationship between the rule of law and the economic growth 
of China. The author argues that China is currently facing the same type of governance 
issues that Asian Tigers have experienced. Asian Tigers ' economic growth has been 
negatively affected by such governance issues .  The author contends that these issues may 
affect China' s economic growth as they have affected Asian Tigers ' growth. Dam avers 
that China' s governance weaknesses are associated with many problems such as a weak 
judiciary. Additionally, the author concludes that there is nothing in China' s experience 
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from which one can conclude that institutions and rule of law are not important for 
economic development. 
Acemoglu et al (2005) examined the link between institutions and long run growth. They 
argue that when political power is allocated to groups that enforce propriety rights, when 
there are few rents that can be sought by the groups in power, and when there are effective 
constraints on power-holders there will surely be a causality from economic institutions to 
economic growth. 
Many studies have been done to determine the relationship between cor ruption and growth 
at the macro-level .  One of such studies has been conducted by Hodge et al, (2009) where 
the authors used an econometric methodology that can take into account the 
multidimensional nature of, as well as the inherent endogeneity in the relationship 
corruption-growth. Overall ,  their results have shown that corruption has negative impacts 
on investment in human capital , physical capital , and political stability which means that 
corruption indirectly impedes growth. 
Drury et al, (2006) studied the connection between corruption, democracy, and growth in 
more than 1 00 countries for the period 1 982-97 .  The authors' findings show that corruption 
does not have any significant impact on growth in democracies. Whereas corruption has 
strong negative effects on growth in non-democratic countries .  
Ahmad et al ,  (20 1 2) used a panel data over the period of 1 984-2009 for 71 developed and 
developing countries to test whether corruption affects the growth or not. Their study 
demonstrates that the relationship between corruption and long run economic growth is 
hump-shaped. Their results also suggest that the quality of public institution has a crucial 
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impact on any country ' s  growth performance .  They conclude that there are many ways 
though which corruption can lessen economic growth, such as lowering domestic and 
foreign direct investment, and overblown government expenditure . 
Guisan (2009) examined the link between government effectiveness, education and 
economic development by comparing European countries to the US and Canada over the 
period of 2000-07 .  The author' s results have shown the importance of government 
effectiveness to economic development. 
Amirkhalkhali and Dar ' s  study investigates the connection between regulatory quality 
and economic growth of the 23 OECD countries over the period 1 996-2008 . They use 
generalized version of the production function model of Solow. Their findings suggest that 
regulatory quality and economic growth are positively correlated.  That is ,  a better 
regulatory quality leads to a high growth rate . The authors argue that regulatory quality has 
an impact on economic growth through its effects on total factor productivity . 
Another study was conducted by Cebula and Foley (20 1 1) to test three hypotheses one of 
which is about how quality government regulation affects per capita real GDP. By using a 
Panel data and PLS estimation for OEC D  countries over the period of 2003-06, the authors 
conclude that better regulatory quality is positively associated with economic growth 
because it has a positive effect on the way market functions and it allows to avoid 
unnecessary costs of managing businesses in the market place.  
Therefore, from the above literature one can conclude that the effects of governance on 
economic growth might be positive, negative, or neutral . Finally, the different conclusions 
raise important policy questions . Does governance improve the long-term economic 
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growth of a country? Why would some countries benefit more from a governance reform 
than other countries? Can appropriate policies make a contribution of governance more 
efficient? These are challenging questions to answer because there are many interrelated 
factors that affect the long-term economic growth of a country. In spite of that, one 
empirical fact is that nations can improve economic growth by adopting appropriate 
policies .  Therefore, one of the goals of this study is to measure association between 
governance, economic growth determinants and economic development and to suggest 
appropriate policies for a country . 
2.2 The Endogeneity of Governance 
The literature review suggests that the relationship between governance and economic 
growth is theoretically ambiguous . This section goes further by arguing that even the 
causality between the two variables is ambiguous as well .  In other words, as we highlighted 
the conflicting effects of governance on economic growth, one may suggest reasons why 
economic growth may have conflicting impacts on governance .  
On the one hand, most governance measures are based on surveys, which may make them 
subjective and limited. The respondents of these surveys are either experts or 
businesspersons . For instance, if a country ' s  economy is growing, one may contend that 
those people may have a positive judgement about the institutional framework within that 
country . Furthermore, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) argue that there is "far more reason to 
believe that growth and development spur improvements in governance than vice versa." 
On the other hand, one may also argue that economic growth does not promote good 
governance .  Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have shown that improved governance tends 
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to spur growth but not vice versa. They contend that, on average, a long term economic 
growth has a negative impact on the quality of governance in different countries around 
the world. 
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Chapter Three 
Data, Summary Statistics, and Conceptual Framework 
Even though there are many determinants that affect the economic development of a 
country, in this study we choose the most relevant ones based on the literature . In this 
section, a description of the chosen variables is given. This explanation will help us to 
choose the appropriate methodology to examine the relationship between governance and 
economic growth. Therefore, the focus of this section is to present the data used and to 
establish a theoretical framework for our quantitative research. 
3.1 Data 
In order to examme this relationship, we use panel data. Panel data contains 
observations of multiple occurrences obtained for different entities over multiple time 
periods. With panel data, we are able to examine the data across and within countries over 
time. Panel data have several advantages. One such advantage, by using panel data one can 
control for individual heterogeneity . Cross-sectional and times series studies do not control 
for heterogeneity which may bias the results .  In our case, when analyzing the effects of 
governance on growth, there might be other variables that are either country-invariant or 
time-invariant variable that affect economic growth within a country. Panel data is able to 
control for these country- or time-invariant variables. 
By combining observations of times series and cross-section, panel data display 
more informative data. Our study will take advantage of having information on economic 
growth, governance, and other economic growth determinants on the selected countries 
over time. Moreover, unlike cross-section and times series, panel data have the advantage 
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of giving a better picture on the dynamics of adjustment. In other word, panel data are 
better in identifying and measuring effects that are simply not detectable neither in pure 
cross-section nor in pure time-series data. Finally, panel data models allow one to construct 
and test more complicated behavioral models than purely cross-section or time series data 
(Baltagi, 2008.) 
Panel data have also some limitations which might be problems that are related to 
design, data collection, and data management of panel surveys such as the problems of 
coverage, non-response, recall ,  frequency of interviewing, interview spacing, reference 
period. Also, there might be selectivity problems and distortions of measurement errors . In 
addition, short time-series dimension might be another limitation of panel data (Baltagi, 
2008.) 
The data used in this paper is collected from the World Bank. However, some countries do 
not have enough data for some variables and some years . Therefore, some countries have 
been removed from the primary database to improve the robustness of the data. Moreover, 
this empirical study is established on panel dataset over the time span 2002 - 20 1 4  to 
investigate the impacts of governance and other economic growth determinants on 
economic growth of 1 9  out of 3 1  low income countries, 34 out of 5 1  lower middle income 
countries, and 25 out of 53 upper middle income countries .  
3.2 Summary Statistics 
The following tables display the descriptive statistics of all used variables by level 
of income of the economies .  
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Table 3 . 1 :  Summary Statistics of Low Income Economies 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Voice and Accountability 247 -0 . 6 1  0 . 50  - 1 .73 0 . 3 8  
Political Stability 247 -0 .68 0 .77 -2 . 5 1  0 .74 
Government Effectiveness 247 -0 . 86  0 .42 - 1 .77 0 .07 
Regulatory Quality 247 -0 .68 0 .42 - 1 . 8 8  0 . 1 8  
Rule of Law 247 -0 .76 0 .42 - 1 . 86 0 . 1 6  
Control of Corruption 247 -0 .69 0 . 36  - 1 .44 0 . 83  
Overall Governance 247 -0 .7 1 0 . 39  - 1 .67 -0 .02 
Ln (Real GDP) 247 5 . 8 5  0 . 39  4 .95  6 .62 
Investment (Percentage of 247 22 .23 7 . 57  GDP) 3 . 95 5 8 . 5 0  
General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure 246 1 3 . 78  5 . 1 7  3 .46 3 1 . 57  
(percentage of GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment, net 245 5 .69 1 0 .25 inflows (Percentage of GDP) - 1 . 5 3  89 .48 
Personal Remittances 
(percentage of GDP) 234 5 .07 6 . 5 3  0 .00 29 .72 
Trade Openness (percentage 246 7 1 .0 1  43 .29 2 1 .67 of GDP) 3 2 1 .63 
Annual Population Growth 247 2 . 8 1 0 .65  1 .00 4 . 1 8  
Human Capital 1 98 59 .48 1 7 .09 20.80  1 04 .07 
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Table 3 .2 :  Summary Statistics of Lower Middle Income Economies 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max Dev 
Voice and Accountability 442 -0 .43 0 .6 1 - 1 . 82  0 .98  
Political Stability 442 -0 . 59  0 . 8 1 -2 . 8 1  1 .42 
Government Effectiveness 442 -0 .49 0 .42 - 1 . 34  0 .73 
Regulatory Quality 442 -0 .48 0 .44 - 1 . 59  0 .93 
Rule of Law 442 -0 . 56  0 .48  - 1 . 52  0 . 57  
Control of  Corruption 442 -0 . 56  0 . 50  - 1 .49 1 .27 
Overall Governance Score 442 -0 .52 0 .4 1 - 1 .45 0 . 54  
Ln (Real GDP) 44 1 7 .07 0 . 5 3  5 . 62 8 .09 
Investment (Percentage of GDP) 432 24. 3 5  9 . 37  4 .70 67 . 9 1  
General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure 432 1 6 .43 1 5 . 05 5 .02 1 56 . 53  
(percentage of GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment, net 440 3 . 86 3 . 98  -3 .28  3 8 . 8 1  inflows (Percentage o f  GDP) 
Personal Remittances 424 9 .95  1 0 .02 0.03 59 . 3 1 (percentage of GDP) 
Trade Openness (percentage of 429 90 . 57  3 7 . 1 8  26 .86  209 . 89  GDP) 
Annual Population Growth 44 1 1 .45 1 . 02 - 1 . 32  4 .94 
Human Capital 345 86 .42 1 4 .79 44.79 1 1 6 . 80  
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Table 3 . 3 :  Summary Statistics of Upper Middle Income Economies 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
325  0 .04 0 .66 - 1 .77  1 . 1 3  
Voice and Accountability 
325  -0 . 1 0  0 .75  -2 . 39  1 .2 1  
Political Stability 
325  -0 .04 0 . 52  - 1 . 1 7  1 .25 
Government Effectiveness 
325  0 .09 0 . 5 1 - 1 .64 1 .00 
Regulatory Quality 
325 -0 . 1 7  0 . 57  - 1 .29 1 . 06 
Rule of Law 
325 -0 . 1 6  0 . 5 5  - 1 .45 1 .25 
Control of Corruption 
325  -0 .06 0 .48 - 1 .06 0 . 87  
Overall Governance Score 
325  8 . 3 9  0 . 3 8  7 .27 9 .09 
Ln (Real GDP) 
Investment (Percentage of 322 24.43 5 . 87 1 2 .49 46.29 
GDP) 
General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure 323 1 4 . 8 1  3 . 78  6 .2 1 27 .5 1 
(percentage of GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment, 
net inflows (Percentage of 325  5 .25 4 . 3 3  -4 . 3 8  3 1 .00 
GDP) 
Personal Remittances 325  4 .25 5 .25 0 .00 26 .68 
(percentage of GDP) 
Trade Openness (percentage 322 92 . 1 2  3 3 . 3 5  32 .98  2 1 0 . 37  
of  GDP) 
324 1 . 05 0 .99 - 1 . 9 1  4 .95  
Annual Population Growth 
270 97 . 7 1  7 .28  78 . 1 1  1 3 1 . 54 
Human Capital 
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The first row in table 5 . 1  exhibits that the mean of voice and accountability for low 
income economies is -0 .6 1 .  The lowest value of this indicator is - 1 .  73 (Congo, Dem. Rep . ,  
2004) and the highest is about 0 . 3 8  (Mali, 2003) ,  and the standard deviation is nearly 0 . 50 .  
The first row in  table 5 .2 shows that the mean of  voice and accountability for lower middle 
economies equals to -0 .43 . The lowest score is - 1 . 82 (Lao PDR, 2003) ,  the highest score is 
about 0 .98  (Cape Verde, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is 0 . 6 1 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the first 
row displays that the average of voice and accountability for the upper middle income 
economies is 0 .04 .  The minimum score is - 1 .  77 (Belarus, 2005),  the highest is about 1 . 1 3  
(Costa Rica, 20 1 4), and the standard deviation is 0 .66 .  
The second row in table 5 . 1  shows that political stability' s mean for low income 
countries is -0 .68 .  The lowest score is about -2 . 5 1 (Burundi, 2004; which can be explained 
by the disaster that happened in Burundi in 2004, in which the Hutu rebel group claimed 
responsibility of attacking a United Nations camp of refugees and killing 1 60 Congolese 
Tutsi refugees), and the highest score is about 0 .74 (Benin, 2002), and the standard 
deviation is about 0 .77 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the second row indicates that the mean of political 
stability is approximately -0 . 59 .  The lowest score is  -2 . 8 1  (Pakistan, 20 1 1 ,  which can be 
explained by some assassination incidences and terrorist attacks), the highest is  about 1 .42 
(Vanuatu, 2005) ,  and the standard deviation equals to 0 . 8 1 .  The second row in table 5 . 2  
confirms that the mean of  political stability is -0 . 1 0 . The lowest score is -2 . 3 9  (Colombia, 
2003 ; which can be explained by San Jose de Apartad6 massacre), the highest is 1 .2 1  
(Dominica, 20 1 1 & 20 1 3 ) ,  and the standard deviation is about 0 .75 . 
The third row in the first table shows that the average of government effectiveness 
for low income countries is about -0 . 86 .  The lowest score is about - 1 . 77  (Congo, Dem. 
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Rep, 2007; Comoros, 2008 & 2009), the highest score is 0 .07 (Rwanda, 20 1 1 ) ,  and the 
standard deviation is nearly 0 .42 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the third row specifies that the mean of 
government effectiveness is -0 .49 .  The lowest score is almost - 1 . 34  (Congo, Rep . ,  2007; 
Cote D ' Ivoire, 2005) ,  the highest is 0 . 73 (Bhutan, 2002), and the standard deviation is 
about 0 . 52 .  The third row in table 5 . 2  displays that government effectiveness ' s  mean of 
upper middle income economies is approximately -0 .04 .  The lowest score equals to - 1 . 1 7  
(Belarus, 2006), the highest is about 1 .25 (Malaysia, 2007), and the standard deviation is 
0 . 52 .  
The fourth row in  table 5 . 1  indicates that the mean of  regulatory quality metric is -
0 .68 .  The lowest score of this metric is about - 1 . 8 8  (Liberia, 2004), the highest score is  
approximately 0 . 1 8  (Rwanda, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is 0 .42 .  The fourth row in 
the table 5 . 2  approves that the average of regulatory quality is -0 .48 . The lowest score is 
about - 1 . 5 9  (Timor-Leste , 2007), the highest is around 0 .93  (Georgia, 20 1 4) ,  and the 
standard deviation equals to 0 .44.  For upper middle income economies, the fourth row in 
table 5 .2 indicates that the mean of regulatory quality is 0 .09 .  The lowest score equals to -
1 . 64 (Belarus,  2006), the highest is about 1 .00 (Mauritius, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation 
is almost 0 . 5 1 .  
The fifth row in table 5 . 1  suggests that the average of rule of law indicator is  about 
-0 .76. The lowest score equals to - 1 . 86  (Liberia, 2002), the highest score is nearly 0 . 1 6  
(Gambia, The, 2003 ) ,  and the standard deviation is 0 .42 .  For lower middle income 
countries, the fifth row in table 5 .2 confirms that rule of law' s mean is -0 . 56 .  The lowest 
score is - 1 . 52  (Nigeria, 2003) ,  the highest equals to 0 . 57  (Cape Verde, 20 1 4 ;  Vanuatu, 
20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is almost 0 .48 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the fifth row demonstrates 
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that the mean of rule of law is -0 . 1 7 . The lowest score is - 1 .29 (Belarus,  2006),  the highest 
equals to 1 . 06 (Mauritius, 2003) ,  and the standard deviation is almost 0 . 57 .  
The sixth row in table 5 . 1 confirms that the mean of control of corruption metric is 
approximately -0 .69 .  The lowest score equals to - 1 .44 (Burundi, 20 1 2) ,  the highest score 
is about 0 . 8 3  (Rwanda, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is  nearly 0 . 36 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the 
sixth row shows that the average of control of corruption -0 . 56 .  The lowest score is - 1 .49 
(Bangladesh, 2004),  the highest is 1 .27 (Bhutan, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation almost 
equal s to 0 . 50 .  For upper middle economies, the sixth row in table 5 .2 illustrates that the 
average of control of corruption -0 . 1 6 . The lowest score is - 1 .45 (Paraguay, 2003) ,  the 
highest is 1 .25  (Botswana, 2003) ,  and the standard deviation almost equals to 0 . 5 5 .  
I n  table 5 . 1 ,  the seventh row confirms that the average of  overall governance i s  
approximately -0 .7 1 .  Besides, the lowest score is  negative 1 . 67 (Liberia, 2002) and the 
highest score is about -0 .02 (Rwanda, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is nearly 0 . 39 .  The 
seventh row in table 5 .2 approves that the mean of overall governance is -0 . 52 .  The lowest 
score is about - 1 .45 (Cote D ' Ivoire, 2005) ,  the highest is around 0 . 54  (Cape Verde, 20 1 1 ) ,  
and the standard deviation equals to  0 .4 1 .  The seventh row in  table 5 . 2  displays that overall 
governance ' s  mean is -0 .06 .  The lowest score equals to - 1 .06 (Belarus,  2006), the highest 
is about 0 . 87  (Botswana, 2003) ,  and the standard deviation is 0 .48 .  
The eighth row in  table 5 . 1  suggests that on  average the natural logarithm of  real 
GDP per capita is nearly 5 . 8 5 .  However, the lowest is 4 .95  (Burundi , 2005) and the highest 
is about 6 .62 (Cambodia, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is nearly 0 . 39 .  Moreover, the 
eighth row in table 5 . 2  exhibits that the mean of the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita is about 7 .07 .  The lowest is 5.62 (Taj ikistan, 2002), the highest is 8 .09 (El Salvador, 
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20 1 4), and the standard deviation is almost 0 . 5 3 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the eighth row displays that 
the average of the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita for the upper middle income 
economies is 8 . 3 9 .  The lowest is 7 .27 (Paraguay, 2002), the highest is about 9 .09 (Turkey, 
20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is 0 . 3 8 .  
The ninth row in  table 5 . 1  proves that the mean of  investment o r  gross capital 
formation (percentage of GDP) is nearly 22 .23%.  Besides, the lowest is about 3 . 95% 
(Burundi,  2002), the highest is almost 5 8 . 50% (Mozambique, 20 1 2), and the standard 
deviation is approximately 7 . 57. In table 5 .2 ,  the ninth row indicates that the mean of the 
gross capital formation (percentage of GDP) is approximately 24 . 35% .  However, the 
lowest is about 4 .70% (Cote D ' Ivoire, 20 1 1 ) , the highest is almost 67 .9 1 % (Bhutan, 2005),  
and the standard deviation equals to 9 . 37 . For upper middle income economies, the ninth 
row in table 5 .2 illustrates that on average gross capital formation (percentage of GDP) is  
nearly 24.43%.  Besides, the lowest almost equals to 1 2 .49% (Dominica, 2002) ,  the highest 
is about 46.29% (Grenada, 2005),  and the standard deviation is 5 . 87 .  
The tenth-row in  table 5 . 1  approves that general government final consumption 
expenditure (percentage of GDP) average is about 1 3 .78%.  However, the lowest is nearly 
3 .46% (Cambodia, 2006), the highest is about 3 1 . 57% (Burundi, 20 1 0), and the standard 
deviation is almost 5 . 1 7 . In table 5 .2 ,  the tenth-row suggests that the mean of general 
government final consumption expenditure (percentage of GDP) is approximately 1 6 .43%.  
Yet, the lowest is about 5 . 02% (Bangladesh, 2002), the highest is 1 56 . 5 3% (Timor-Leste, 
2002), and the standard deviation is about 1 5 . 05 . The tenth-row in table 5 . 2  confirms that 
the mean of general government final consumption expenditure is nearly 1 4 . 8 1 %.  
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Nevertheless, the lowest is 6 .2 1 %  (Dominican Republic, 2004), the highest is 27 .5 1 %  
(Namibia, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is about 3 . 78 .  
The eleventh-row in  table 5 . 1  confirms that the mean of  foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (percentage of GDP) is approximately 5 . 69%. Furthermore, the lowest is less 
than - 1 . 5 3% (Congo, Dep .  Rep . ,  20 1 2), the highest is  almost 89 .48% (Liberia, 2003),  and 
the standard deviation is about 1 0 .25 . In table 5 .2 ,  the eleventh-row approves that foreign 
direct investment ' s  mean is almost 3 . 86%. The lowest score is about -3 .28% (Swaziland, 
2003) ,  the highest is around 3 8 . 8 1 % (Congo, Rep . ,  20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation equals 
to 3 . 98 .  In table 5 .2 ,  the eleventh-row shows that on average foreign direct investment is 
nearly 5 .25%.  Besides, the lowest is -4 . 3 8% (Namibia, 20 1 3) ,  the highest almost equals to 
3 1 . 00% (Bulgaria, 2007), and the standard deviation is about 4 . 3 3 .  
The twelfth-row in table 5 . 1 presents that the average of personal remittances 
(percentage of GDP) is about 5 . 07%. Furthermore, the lowest is 0 .00% (Burundi, 2006), 
the highest is nearly 29 .72% (Liberia, 20 1 2), and the standard deviation is 6 . 53 . For lower 
middle income countries, the twelfth-row in table 5 . 2  confirms that personal remittances'  
mean is 9 .95%. The lowest is 0 .03% (Lao PDR, 2005),  the highest almost equals to 59 . 3% 
(Lesotho, 2002), and the standard deviation is almost 1 0 .02 .  In  table 5 .2 ,  the twelfth-row 
displays that the average of personal remittances for the upper middle income economies 
is 4 .25 . However, the lowest is 0 .00% (Mauritius, 20 1 3 ) ,  the highest is about 26 .68% 
(Lebanon, 2004), and the standard deviation is 5 . 2 5 .  
The thirteenth-row in  table 5 . 1  supports that on  average trade openness (percentage 
of GDP) is about 7 1 . 0 1  %. Furthermore, the lowest is almost 2 1 .67% (Burundi, 2002), the 
highest is more than 3 2 1 .63% (Liberia, 2008),  and the standard deviation is about 43 .29 .  
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In table 5 .2 ,  the thirteenth-row illustrates that the mean of trade openness 90 .57%. 
Moreover, the lowest is nearly 26 .86% (Bangladesh, 2004), the highest is about 209 . 89% 
(Lesotho, 2002), and the standard deviation equals to 37 . 1 8 . For upper middle countries, 
the thirteenth-row in table 5 .2 proves that the average of trade openness is almost 92. 1 2%.  
Moreover, the lowest is approximately 3 3 . 3 5% (Colombia, 2002), the highest is around 
2 1 0 . 37% (Malaysia, 2004), and the standard deviation is 3 3 .3 5 .  
The fourteenth-row in table 5 . 1  suggests that the average o f  the annual population 
growth is almost 2 . 8 1 %. Besides, the lowest is about 1 . 00% (Nepal , 2008),  the highest is 
nearly 4 . 1 8% (Liberia, 2008) ,  and the standard deviation is approximately 0 .65 . In table 
5 .2 ,  the fourteenth-row reveals that population growth mean is  around 1 .45%.  However, 
the lowest is less than - 1 .32% (Georgia, 20 1 0), the highest is 4 .94% (Timor-Leste , 20 1 1 ) ,  
and the standard deviation is about 1 .02 .  The fourteenth-row in  table 5 . 2  approves that the 
annual population growth average for the upper middle income economies is about 1 . 05%. 
The lowest is less  than - 1 . 9 1 %  (Bulgaria, 2002), the highest is around 4 . 95%, and the 
standard deviation is nearly 0 .99 .  
The last row in table 5 . 1  supports that the average of primary completion rate is  
about 59 .48% However, the lowest almost equals to 20 . 80% (Niger, 2003) ,  the highest is 
about 1 04 .07% (Nepal, 20 1 4) ,  and the standard deviation is approximately 1 7 .09 .  In table 
5 .2, the last row suggests that on average primary completion rate is approximately 
86 .42%. In addition, the lowest is around 44.79% (Cote D ' Ivoire, 2006), the highest is 
about 1 1 6 . 80% (Ukraine, 2005), and the standard deviation almost equals to 1 4 .79 .  Finally, 
the last row in table 5 .2  shows that the mean of primary completion rate is 97. 7 1  %.  Besides, 
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the lowest is nearly 78 . 1 1 % (Lebanon, 20 1 3) ,  the highest is about 1 3 1 . 54% (Belarus, 2002), 
and the standard deviation is almost 7 .28 .  
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Economic Growth 
Annual real GDP per capita is one of the best indicators to measure a country' s economy 
performance . In this research paper, the GDP per capita based on constant 2005 US dollars 
is used as a proxy for economic growth. The motivation of using this variable rather than 
other variables is its popularity in governance literature (i .e., Kandil, 2009; Omoteso & 
Ishola Mobolaj i, 2014) .  As a result, real GDP per capita is the dependent variable.  
Economic Growth Determinants 
The research uses lagged (one-year) real GDP per capita, the six indicators of 
governance, overall governance (the average of governance indicators,) investment, human 
capital , government expenditure, personal remittances, which are considered as the maj or 
economic determinants . As well as trade openness, foreign direct investment, and 
population growth which are considered as the minor economic determinants in this study. 
• Lagged Real GDP per Capita 
Lagged (one-year) real GDP per capita is used as an explanatory variable.  This study 
utilizes one lag of real GDP per capita. This variable measures the previous income of the 
country that affects economic growth. Some econometricians (i . e .  Nickell, 1981 )  argue 
that using the first lag of the dependent variable does not work with short time series and 
since our study has a time span of 1 3  years , we exclude this variable from our study. 
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• Governance Indicators 
The aggregate indicators of governance integrate the views of large number of citizen, 
enterprise, and expert survey respondents. They are based on hundreds of variables 
obtained from over 30 data sources (WB.)  The WB captures six dimensions of governance .  
These s ix dimensions are sorted into three features of governance :  the political aspect 
which is measured through the indictors of "Voice and Accountability" and "Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism", the economic aspect which is evaluated 
based on the indicators of "Government Effectiveness" and "Regulatory Quality'' ,  and the 
institutional aspect which is estimated by the indicators of "Rule of Law" and "Control of 
Corruption" (Kaufman et al., 201 1 ) .  
These six dimensions of  governance are measured both by: A Governance Score that gives 
a country a score on the aggregate indicator that ranges approximately from -2 . 5  to 2 . 5 ,  
high values correspond to  better governance, and a Percentile Rank which indicates the 
country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 
corresponding to the lowest rank, and 1 00 to the highest rank (WB.) These indicators can 
be defined according to Kaufmann et al, (201 1) as follows : 
Voice and Accountability (VA) : expresses to which extent a country' s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and free media. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS) :  captures "the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism."  
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Government Effectiveness (GE) : represents "the quality of public services, the quality of 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,  the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies ."  
Regulatory Quality (RQ) : captures "the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development ." 
Rule of Law (RL) : expresses "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence . "  
Control of  Corruption (CC) : "captures perceptions of  the extent to which public power i s  
exercised for  private gain, including both petty and grand forms of  corruption, as well as 
"capture " of the state by elites and private interests . "  
• Investment 
Investment is one of the most relevant determinants that directly affect a country' s  
economic growth. Gross capital formation (percentage o f  GDP) i s  used in this paper as a 
proxy for investment. Gross capital formation is also referred to as gross domestic 
investment. It is a good measurement of real investment because it "consists of outlays on 
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories" 
(WB .)  
• Human Capital 
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Human capital has been seen as one of the crucial elements of production that can be used 
to create goods and services and generate added-values through inputting it. It was first 
introduced to the economic literature as early as 1 690 by William Petty. It was also 
reflected in Smith ' s  ( 1 776) work as well as Farr ( 1 853) ,  and Engel ( 1 883 ) .  However, it did 
not regain recognition in the literature until 1 960 ' s  by Schultz ( 1 96 1 ) , Becker ( 1 964) and 
Mincer ( 1 974) . Since then, it has been widely used to address a variety of issues such as 
economic growth, education, migration, and social exclusion (Liu & Fraumeni, 2014 . )  
The OECD definition of human capital is widely accepted as  a useful reference point.  
According to OECD, human capital can be defined as "the knowledge, skills ,  competencies 
and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and 
economic well-being" (OECD, 200 1 ) . In fact, human capital can be accumulated through 
different channels which are characterized as both life-long and life-wide, including not 
only families and schools but also workplaces and daily life (Liu & Fraumeni, 2014 . )  
The task of encompassing the elements mentioned in  the above definition into a single 
measure has never been easy. As a result, scholars and institutions frequently choose formal 
education as the main form of human capital investment. However, there is another 
approach used in measuring human capital called "monetary measures" which can be 
divided to three approaches :  the cost-based, the income-based, and the residual approaches .  
The cost-based approach "measures human capital by looking at the stream of past 
investments undertaken by individuals, households, employers and governments (e .g .  
Shultz, 1 96 1 ;  Kendrick, 1 976;  Eisner, 1 985) .  It relies on information about al l  the inputs 
that are incurred when producing human capital . "  The income-based approach "measures 
human capital by looking at the stream of future earnings that human capital investment 
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generates over a person ' s  lifetime (e .g .  Weisbrod, 1 96 1 ;  Graham and Webb, 1 979;  
Jorgenson and Fraumeni , 1 989,  l 992a, l 992b ) . "  Finally, the residual approach which 
"measures human capital as the difference between the total wealth and the sum of 
produced and natural capitals" (Liu & Fraumeni, 2014 . )  
In this study, we choose formal education as  the main human capital investment. The most 
common variable used in economic literature ( i .e .  Barro, 1989;  Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009) as a proxy for human capital is secondary school enrollment as percentage of the 
population aged 1 5  or over. However, because of the availability problem of the data of 
this variable especially for low income economies,  we use in this paper primary completion 
rate, total (% of relevant age group) as a proxy for human capital . 
• Government Expenditure 
General government final consumption expenditure is used as a benchmark of government 
expenditure . This benchmark shows the effects of government expenditure on economic 
growth. The source of the data of this variable is the World Bank. 
• Personal Remittances 
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) are used in this paper as an independent 
variable. They consist of personal transfers and compensation of employees.  Personal 
transfers are current transfers either in cash or in kind received by resident households. 
Compensation of employees consist of the income of border, seasonal, and other short­
term workers employed in an economy in which they are not residents and of residents 
employed by nonresidents entities .  This 
• Trade Openness 
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Trade is the sum of imports and exports of goods and services which is measured as share 
of GDP . The nation is more open to trade when the trade percentage of GDP is high. As a 
results the trade percentage of GDP is the measurement for trade openness .  
• Foreign Direct Investment 
This paper uses foreign direct investment, net inflows (percentage of GDP) as a proxy for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) .  Foreign direct investment refers to direct investment 
equity flows in the reporting economy (WB).  The FDI data source is the World Bank 
dataset. 
• Population Growth 
Population growth can be measured in different ways . In the growth literature, population 
growth is widely used (i .e .  Mankiw et al., 1990) . In this study we use annual population 
growth rate as a proxy for population growth. According to the World Bank "annual 
population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population 
from year t- 1 to t, expressed as a percentage ."  The source of this variable is World bank. 
Sample Division 
In order to examme properly the relationship between governance and 
economic growth, our sample economies are divided based on their income level to 
low income, lower middle income, and upper middle income. Every year, the World 
B ank revises the classification of world ' s  economies based on estimates of gross 
national income (GNI) per capita for the previous year, using the World B ank Atlas 
Method. Low income countries are those with a GNI per capita less or equal to 
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$ 1 ,045 in 20 1 4 .  The middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita that 
is greater than $ 1 ,045 but less than $ $ 1 2 ,73 6 .  Moreover, lower middle income 
economies and upper middle income countries are separated at a GNI per capita of 
$4, 1 25 (WB, 2015). 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology, Estimation, and Prepositions 
4 .1  Methodology 
The research uses Panel data for the time span of 2002 - 20 1 4  to investigate the impacts of 
governance and other economic growth determinants on economic growth of 1 1 0 
developing countries divided based on their level of income. 
In this paper, we work with the following equation: 
Lnrgdpit = Eo + E 1 gOVit + E2Xit + lli + Ait ( 1 )  
Where, the subscript i (= 1 , . . .  , n) represents country and t (= 1 ,  . . .  , T) the period (years . )  
Lngdpit indicates the natural logarithm of the annual GDP per capita based on constant 
2005 US dollars, goVit symbolizes the average of governance indicators,  Xit refers to the 
set of control variables mentioned in the preceding equations, lli represents the unobserved 
country-specific fixed effect such as country' s location, demography, culture that need to 
be controlled before we explore the impact of explanatory variables on economic growth 
to avoid misspecification of the model, and Ait stands for the error term. The main goal is 
to determine whether the average of governance indicators has a significant effect on the 
economic growth. That is ,  to test whether E 1  is statistically significant or not. 
We obtain the following model by including all the explanatory variables in the control 
matrix Xit in addition to the governance indicators :  
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Where govexpit represents general government final consumption expenditure (percentage 
of GDP), remit refers to personal remittances received, humit denotes human capital , inVit 
denotes gross capital formation (percentage of GDP).  
Moreover, we introduce the minor economic growth determinants to our model which is 
going to look as follows : 
e1pop .gwthit + lli + Ait (3 ) 
Where, fdiit is foreign direct investment, net inflows (percentage of GDP), tradeit refers to 
trade openness, which is the trade percentage of GDP, and pop .gwthit is the annual population 
growth. 
In addition, the effect of governance on growth may occur over time rather than all at once. 
Therefore, we introduce a distributed-lag model to estimate the impact of one-year lag 
governance on the growth. That is, to test how governance at time t - 1 would affect the 
growth rate at time t. As a result, the models can be rewritten as follows : 
Additionally, governance may affect the growth through different channels .  We use the 
following equations to discover whether governance affects the growth through trade 
openness, the FDI, and investment channels and to determine the marginal impact of 
governance on trade openness, the FDI and the investment. 
Lnrgdpit = Eo + E J gOVit + E2goveXPit + E3remit+ E4inVit + EshUIDit + E6tradeit + 
E1(govi1*tradeit) + lli + Ait (5) 
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£7(gOVit* fdii1) + T)i + Ait (6) 
(7) 
Where govi1* tradei1 denotes the interaction between governance and trade openness,  
govi1 *fdL1 represents the interaction between governance and the FDI, and govi1 * inVit 
represents the interaction between the average of governance and investment. 
Finally, in order to determine which indicator of governance affects economic growth the 
most at each level of income, we introduce the six indicators of governance to our model, 
one at a time . The equation looks as follows 
Lnrgdpit = £0 + i:: i indit + £2govexpi1 + £3remi1+ £4inVit + £shumi1 + T) i + Ait (8) 
Where indit denotes one of the six indicators of governance which are vmce and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
4.2 Estimation 
We can use d ifferent methods to estimate our models  such as fixed effect, random effect, 
dynamic panel model , GMM, and instrumental variables .  However, country-specific effects that 
may affect economic growth are difficult to identify and measure . If the unobserved country 
spec ific variables are correlated with the regressors, our model s  wi l l  produce biased results.  To 
solve this problem, one can use e ither fixed effects, random effects, or first differences .  However, 
s ince random effect necess itates that the omitted variables be uncorrelated with the regressors, it is  
preferred to e ither use fixed effect or first differences.  In this  paper, we uti l ize economic reasons 
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and statistical ins ights to choose the right mode l .  After us ing Hausman test, our findings suggest 
that random effects-model performs better than fixed-effects model for l ow income and upper 
middle income countries .  Yet, for lower middle income economies,  fixed effect outperforms 
random effects .  S ubsequently, our study finds serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problem in 
the data set. One way to correct for both problems is  to use random effect c luster and fixed effect 
c luster to estimate the model s .  
4.3 .  Propositions 
Based on the literature, this paper develops the following hypotheses :  
Proposition 1 :  The Effects of Overall Governance on Economic Growth 
There is a strong argument whether the effect of governance on economic growth is 
positive or insignificant. However, this study assumes that better governance lead to higher 
economic growth (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002.) Thus, EJ > 0 is tested against the null 
hypothesis E1  = 0. 
Proposition2 : The Effects of One-Year Lag Overall Governance on Economic Growth 
The effects of a governance reform may not appear immediately after implementing a new 
policy or making a new law. However, governance impact on the growth might take time 
to be noticed and become conspicuous . Therefore, checking the impact of one-year lag 
governance on economic growth is highly important. This study tests the null hypothesis 
E1  = 0 against the alternative E1  > 0. 
Proposition 3: The Effects of Human Capital on Economic Growth 
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The impact of human capital on economic growth is controversial . While many scholars 
argue that human capital promotes economic growth (i .e .  Mincer, 1984;  Becker et al., 
1994 ; Nelson and Phelps, 1966;  Lucas, 1988 ; Becker, Murphy, & Tamura, 1990; 
Rebelo, 1992 ; Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin, 1992 ; and Barro, 1992) ,  some other 
researchers contend that human capital does not explain economic growth (i .e .  Benhabib 
& Spiegel, 1994) Therefore, we test £5=0 against £5>0. 
Proposition 4: The Effects of Investment Economic Growth 
Solow model (1956) indicates that high domestic investment is a sign of high savings and 
resources of economic growth. Since the domestic investment is used in this paper, it is 
assumed that investment will have a positive impact on the growth. Therefore, £4 = 0 is 
verified against £4>0.  
Proposition 5 :  The Effects of Government Expenditure on Economic Growth 
On the one hand, some studies have shown that there is no significant association between 
government expenditure and economic growth. On the other hand, other studies have 
shown that there is a negative relationship between the two variables (Barro, 1991 . )  In this 
study we test the null hypothesis £2 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis £2 < 0 .  
Proposition 6 :  The  Effects Remittances on Economic Growth 
Remittances may boost economic growth especially in developing countries as it was 
argued by many scholars (i .e .  Pradhan, Upadhyay, M., & Upadhyaya, K., 2008; 
Catrinescu et al., 2009) However, other researchers contend that remittances knock 
economic growth (i .e .  Karagoz, 2009; Rao & Hassan, 201 1) .  We therefore check the 
hypothesis £3 = 0 against £3 > 0 .  
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Proposition 7 :  The Effects of FDI on Economic Growth 
A considerable argument among scholars is taking place about the relationship between 
the growth and the FDI. On the one hand, Alfaro' s  (2003) study has shown that the 
relationship between the two variable is ambiguous . On the other hand, Forte and Mora ' s  
(2010) study concludes that FDI  has a positive effect on  economic growth. Moreover, 
Hermes and Leusink (2003) argue that the two variables are significantly positively 
correlated, given that the recipient country of the FDI has developed its financial system. 
Thus, this study hypothesizes that £5 =O against the alternative hypothesis £5 > 0 .  
Proposition 8:  The Effects of Trade Openness on Economic Growth 
While some economists (i . e .  Yanikkaya, 2003) argue that trade openness has a negative 
impact on economic growth especially for developing countries, some other economists 
(Romer & Frankel, 1 999) contend that trade openness has significant positive effects on 
the growth. Therefore, this paper verifies c: 6 = 0 against £6 > 0 .  
Proposition 9:  The  Effects of  Population Growth on Economic Growth 
The argument about the relationship between economic growth and population growth goes 
way back to Malthus ( 1 798) .  The consensus of economists about this relationship has 
shifted from saying fertility has strong negative effects (e .g .  Malthus, 1 798) to not being 
important and recently to having some significant impact on economic growth (Ashraf et 
al. 2013 . )  Thus, in this study we verify a7 = 0 against a7> 0 .  
4.4 .  Economies ' Classification 
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Economies are divided based on their level of income into low income, lower middle 
income, and upper middle income economies. Table 4 . 1 displays economies of each 
category : 
Table 4 . 1 :  Countries Sample 
List of Low list of Lower Middle List of Upper Middle 
Income Income Income 
Benin Malawi Armenia Lao PDR Albania Kazakhstan 
Burkina 
Faso Mali Bangladesh Lesotho Belarus Lebanon 
Macedonia, 
Burundi Mozambique Bhutan Moldova Belize FYR 
Cambodia Nepal Bolivia Morocco Botswana Malaysia 
Comoros Niger Cape Verde Nicaragua Bulgaria Mauritius 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep . Rwanda Congo, Rep . Nigeria Colombia Mexico 
Gambia, 
The Tanzania Cote d'Ivoire Pakistan Costa Rica Namibia 
Egypt, Arab 
Guinea Togo Rep . Philippines Dominica Panama 
Dominican 
Liberia Uganda El Salvador Senegal Republic Paraguay 
Madagascar Georgia Sri Lanka Ecuador Peru 
Ghana Swaziland Grenada Romania 
Guatemala Taj ikistan Jordan Tunisia 
Tim or-
Guyana Leste Turkey 
Honduras Ukraine 
India Vanuatu 
Indonesia Vietnam 
Kyrgyz West Bank 
Republic and Gaza 
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Chapter Five 
Summary Statistics, Results and Economic Insights 
5.2 Results and Economic Insights 
Tables 5 . 1 ,  5 .2 ,  and 5 . 3  show that overall governance and one-year lag overall 
governance are highly positively associated with economic growth regardless of the 
income level of the countries .  Indeed, social infrastructure has been seen as the most 
essential determinant of the long-term economic performance within a country. Social 
infrastructure refers to the institutions and government policies that organize the economic 
environment in which individuals and firms can invest, create and transfer ideas, and 
produce goods and services (Hall and Jones, 1999.)  
Moreover, i t  has been argued that the slow growth rates of maj ority of the 
economies around the globe can be explained not only by the macroeconomic situation, 
but also by "governance policy gap" or the stagnation of some wellbeing standards ; such 
as the quality of the institutional structure, independence of the judiciary, level of 
corruption and the ease of doing business (Kaufmann, 2003.) Empirically, Roll and 
Talbott 's  (2003) study has shown that 80 percent of the differences between countries in 
the GNI per capita can be explained by governance determinants such as property rights, 
political rights, freedom of speech, etc . 
Furthermore, we can conclude that governance in our developing countries sample 
is a binding constraint as it was suggested by Rodrik (2008 . )  In fact, good governance 
enhances the clarity of the "rules of the game" for the producers as well as households and 
assures that investors can better appropriate the returns to their efforts (Rodrik, 2008), all 
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of which may reduce economic uncertainty which has adverse effects on economic growth. 
Indeed, economic certainty is crucial in the investors ' decision-making process especially 
in case of "long-lived investment proj ects that are economically costly to reverse ." Higher 
uncertainty levels in a country can push investors to sacrifice the current returns to receive 
more information in order to make the right decision. As a result, "high uncertainty and the 
possibility that new information will change proj ect rankings depress current investment" 
(Bernanke, 1983.) 
In addition, from a historical point of view, Acemoglu, Robinson & Johnson 
(2002) argue that countries that were relatively wealthier in the 1 6th century and were 
colonized by European countries in the last 500 years are currently poorer. The authors 
contend that the main reason that can explain this situation is not geographic factors as it 
has been argued, but rather is the changes in the institutions resulting from the European 
colonialism. In fact, the European colonialism has created an "institutional reversal" within 
the colonized countries which accounts for the reversal in relative incomes .  In our study, 
more than 80 % of the countries included were under European colonialization. Hence, it 
makes sense to assume that economic performance of these countries is affected by the 
institutional changes made by the European colonizers as argued by Acemoglu, Robinson 
and Johnson. 
In addition, citizens in well-governed countries are less likely to be violent or poor. 
In fact, when residents ' voice is heard and their human rights are protected, they are less 
likely to lean towards violence and think of it as a solution. Moreover, when poor citizens 
are allowed to speak, their governments are more likely to provide national policies that 
will help to reduce poverty (UN; un.org) Moreover, good governance can help in tackling 
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high poverty rates either through the reduction of income inequality or through the 
correction of market failures that developing economies are subject to . Indeed, governance 
is linked with income inequality through two channels ;  the first is the political institutions 
while the second is the control of corruption. It has been argued that a more equal income 
distribution is one of the results of an egalitarian distribution of political rights in the form 
of democracy. However, the present evidence does not prove the existence of any robust 
relationship between democracy and income inequality in cross-country studies;  for 
instance, Bollen and Jackman ( 1 985)  could not detect such a relationship ; Li, Squire, and 
Zou ' s  study ( 1 998) suggests that there is a limited support for a negative relationship 
between democracy and income distribution; and Gradstein, Milanovic, and Ying (200 1 )  
find that democracy has a negative but weak impact on income inequality. Moreover, 
Perotti ( 1 996) and Benabou ( 1 996) contend that income inequality could lead to "unstable 
political institutions as power swings back and forth between redistributive populist 
factions and oligarchy-protecting conservative factions" (Zhuang, De Dios, & Martin, 
2010.) 
For the relationship corruption-inequality, Johnston ( 1 989) argues that high levels 
of corruption could widen income inequality. Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) 
suggest the different channels through which corruption could increase income inequality . 
For instance, corruption may lead to tax evasion, defective tax administration; two of which 
can cause market failures ,  and exemptions that favor the wealthy, etc . Therefore, political 
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Table 5 . 1 :  Governance and Economic G rowth in Low Income Economies 
Mode l l Model 2 Mode l 3 Mode l 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Overal l  governance 0 . 1 64 * * *  ----- 0 . 1 77* * *  0 . 1 6 1  * * *  0 . 1 68 * * *  0 . 1 75 * * *  
(0 .0528) ----- (0.0540) (0 .0523) (0.0557) (0 .0575) 
Government Expenditure 0 .00 1 03 0 .002 1 9  -0 .0000756 0 .00 1 07 0 .00 1 3 1  0 .000 1 22 
(0.00554) (0 .00477) (0 .00567) (0 .00565) (0.005 76) (0.005 8 1 )  
Investment 0 .0035 1 * 0 .00348**  0 .00278 0 .003 83 * *  0 .003 5 0* *  0 .00306* 
(0 .00 1 79) (0.00 1 66) (0 .00 1 89) (0 .00 1 76) (0 .00 1 77) (0 .00 1 83)  
Human Capital 0 .00595 * * *  0 .00525 * * *  0 .006 1 1 * * *  0 .006 1 9* * *  0 .0060 1 * * *  0 .0064 1 * * *  
(0 .00 1 53)  (0 .00 1 42) (0 .00 1 47) (0 .00 1 73)  (0 .00 1 6 1 )  (0.00 1 72) 
Rem ittances 0 .00309 0 .00436* 0 .00272 0 .00 1 84 0 .00246 0 .000765 
(0.00279) (0 .00224) (0 .00306) (0.00390) (0.00409) (0.00539) 
One- Year Lag Overall 0 . 1 45 * * *  
Governance 
(0 .0554) 
FDI 0 .00 1 55 0 .00 1 74 
(0 .00 1 7 1 )  (0.00 1 66) 
Trade Openness -0.000499 -0 .000549 
(0 .000597) (0 .0005 1 2) 
Population Growth -0 .0205 -0.0 1 25 
(0 .05 1 1 ) (0 .0445) 
Constant 5 . 500** *  5 . 5 1 0* * *  5 . 525 * * *  5 . 5 1 8* * *  5 . 5 5 6* * *  5 . 58 1 * * *  
(0. 1 24) (0. 1 1 4) (0. 1 24) (0 . 1 1 6) (0 . 1 5 1 )  (0. 1 64) 
R2 0 .5 1 9  0 .489 0 .532  0 .523  0 . 520 0 .53 8 
Chi2 1 00 .9* * *  86 .07* * *  l 08 .2* * *  99. 1 6* * *  92.06* * * 9 1 .86* * *  
Observations 1 89 1 76 1 88 1 88 1 89 1 87 
Note: Model is based on Random E ffect Cluster method and R squared within. Moreover, *= 1 0% significance;  * *=5% significance;  * *  *= 1 % significance. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
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Table 5 .2 :  Governance and Economic Growth in Lower Middle Income Economies 
Model 1 Mode l 2 Model 3 Mode l 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Overa l l  governance 0 .337* * *  0 . 336* * *  0 .325 * * *  0 .3 3 8* * *  0 .323 ***  
(0 .0980) (0.0990) (0. 1 09) (0.0970) (0. 1 09) 
Government Expenditure 0 .00468 0 .00352 0 .0045 8 0 .005 53  0 .004 1 4  0 .0044 1 
(0.003 76) (0.003 1 5) (0.003 79) (0.003 5 1 )  (0 .00425)  (0 .00405) 
Investment 0 .00748** *  0 .0069 1 * * *  0 .0073 5 * * *  0 .00849* * *  0 .00766* * *  0 .00877***  
(0.002 1 2) (0.00 1 80) (0 .002 1 5) (0 .0023 8) (0 .00222) (0.00262) 
Human Capital 0.00777* * *  0 .008 1 4* * *  0 .00776* * *  0 .00747* * *  0 .00785 * * *  0 .00758** *  
(0 .00 1 28) (0 .00 1 1 5) (0 .00 1 27) (0.00 1 36) (0 .00 1 32) (0.00 1 3 8) 
Rem ittances 0 .0022 1 0 .00 1 1 9  0 .002 1 6  0 .00272 0 .00224 0 .00277 
(0.00362) (0.003 53)  (0.00366) (0.00275)  (0.00374) (0 .00293) 
One- Year Lag Overa l l  Governance 0 .308* * *  
(0 .0826) 
FDI 0 .00 1 33 0 .00207 
(0.00224) (0.002 1 9) 
Trade Openness -0.00 1 49 -0.00 1 66* 
(0.000986) (0.000975) 
Population Growth -0 .02 1 0  -0.04 1 8  
(0 .044 1 )  (0.0444) 
Constant 6.287** *  6 .297* * *  6 .288* * *  6 .394* * *  6 . 3 1 3 * * *  6 .460** *  
(0 . 1 49) (0. 1 37) (0 . 1 49) (0. 1 7 1 )  (0 . 1 5 5)  (0. 1 78) 
R1 0 .477 0 .490 0.478 0 .494 0.479 0 .5 0 1  
F 20.49* * *  22 .50* * *  1 8 . 37* * *  1 6 .97* * *  1 7 .49* * *  1 3 . 1 2* * *  
Observations 326 30 1 326 323 326 323 
Note : Model is based o n  Fixed Effect Cluster method and R squared within. Moreover, * = 1 0% significance; * *=5% significance; * * * = 1 %  significance. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
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Table 5 . 3 :  Governance and Economic Growth in U��er Middle Income Economies 
Mode l 1 Model 2 Mode l 3 Model 4 Mode l 5 Model 6 
Overa l l  governance 0 .3 1 7**  0 .320** 0 .3 1 6**  0 .3 1 2**  0 .3 1 4** 
(0. 1 3 5)  (0 . 1 3 7) (0. 1 3 5)  (0. 1 23)  (0. 1 24) 
Government Expenditure -0 .0 1 32 -0 .0 1 06 -0. 0 1 3 1  -0 .0 1 32 -0 .0 1 3 1  -0 .0 1 30 
(0 .0 1 1 8) (0.0 1 1 7) (0 .0 1 1 7) (0 .0 1 25)  (0 .0 1 1 7) (0 .0 1 22) 
Investment 0 .0 1 3 7** *  0 .0 1 09** *  0 .0 1 4 1  • • •  0 .0 1 3 7***  0 .0 1 39***  0 .0 1 4 1  • • •  
(0 .004 1 1 )  (0 .00347) (0.00430) (0.00433 )  (0 .004 1 4) (0.00448) 
Human Capital  0 .00266 0 .00433 ** 0 .00266 0 .00266 0 .00260 0 .00263 
(0.00232) (0.002 1 2) (0.00229) (0 .002 1 9) (0 .00222) (0.002 1 2) 
Remittances -0.0283 ** *  -0 .0345 ** *  -0 .028 1 * * *  -0 .0283 ***  -0 .0285** *  -0 .0283 ***  
(0 .0098 1 )  (0 .0073 7) (0 .0 1 0 1 )  (0.00995) (0 .0 1 02) (0 .0 1 05 )  
One- Year Lag Overall Governance 0 .302** 
(0 . 1 29) 
FDI -0 .00 1 52 -0.00 1 07 
(0.003 1 9) (0 .00343) 
Trade Openness - 0 .0000694 
0 .00000 1 45 
(0.00 1 50) (0.00 1 50) 
Population Growth 0 .003 88  0 .00359 
(0 .0398) (0 .03 85)  
Constant 8 . 1 1 9** *  8 .026***  8 . 1 1 6** *  8 . 1 1 9** *  8 . 1 1 5 * * *  8 . 1 04•• •  
(0.294) (0.220) (0.290) (0 .309) (0 .293) (0 .306) 
R2 0 .357  0 . 383 0 . 358  0 . 357  0 .3 5 8  0 .359 
Chi2 46. 1 8** *  7 1 . 1 7** *  46 .64** *  5 1 . 54 • • •  7 1 .3 5 ** *  77 .29** *  
Observations 268 246 268 268 267 267 
Note : Model is based on Random Effect C luster method and R squared within. Moreover, * = 1 0% significance;  * * =5% significance ; * * *= I %  significance .  
Robust standard errors are in  parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
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corruption increases income inequality, while higher levels of income inequality also may 
increase levels of corruption (Zhuang, De Dios, & Martin, 2010.) 
General government final consumption expenditure is  not associated with 
economic growth in our models regardless of the group ' s  income level .  Our findings are 
similar to those found by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Diamond ( 1 989) (Chu, et 
al., 1995 . )  Moreover, Government expenditures are classified to two categories :  productive 
and unproductive expenditures .  While the former is assumed to have a direct impact on 
economic growth rate, the latter is assumed to have an indirect or no effect on economic 
growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992.)  We can therefore conclude that government 
final consumption expenditure in our sample of countries is unproductive . In other words, 
governments may spend their budgets on proj ects that do not affect the country' s  economic 
growth. In addition, as Barro (1991) and Fan, Yu, & Saurkar (2006) empirical studies 
show that low per capita growth is caused by devoting a large share of government 
spending to non-productive government services. 
Moreover, our findings indicate that investment is  positively associated with 
economic growth and statistically significant at a level of 1 % for lower middle and upper 
middle income economies and at 5% level in low income countries .  However, the 
coefficients are moderately different from zero . Such a result was found by Artadi and 
Sala-i-Martin (2003) . They have shown that despite the slight increase in investment 
which might be emanating from some reforms implemented last few decades,  and which 
led to a tenuous growth rate, the level of the investment is too low to help to boost the 
growth over the next decades .  The pivotal question here i s :  why a maj or determinant of 
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growth as investment is found to have minimal effects on growth in developing countries 
regardless of their income? 
A potential reason might be the rate of return to investment in these countries, as it 
was argued by Collier and Pattillo (2000.)  The authors contend that the rate of return to 
investment in Africa, for instance, was one third below that elsewhere . Moreover, the 
authors indicate that investment risk was very high for several reasons such as political 
instability, price volatility, and an uncertain macroeconomic environment . Furthermore, 
another reason might be the investment price ratio which refers to investment goods price 
relative to consumption goods price (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller, 2003) .  The 
authors argue that countries in which consumption goods tend to be less expensive relative 
to investment goods are countries that tend to have smaller growth rates .  For instance, 
while investment price ratio in Africa as a whole is slightly above 1 20 which is unfavorably 
compared to that of 70 found in OECD and East Asia (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003 . )  
Human capital is one of the most important variables in  growth models .  Theoretical 
and empirical analysis, such as Nelson & Phelps ( 1 966) ; Lucas ( 1 988) ;  Becker, Murphy, 
& Tamura ( 1 990); Rebelo ( 1 992); and Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin ( 1 992) (Barro, 1 992), 
have suggested that human capital makes a great deal to economic growth and therefore to 
countries '  economic development. These works refer two ways in which educational 
investment can be a part in generating growth. The first way is that human capital and its 
accumulation can directly contribute in the production as a productive factor and therefore 
affects the growth of output (i . e .  Solow, 1 956 ;  Lucas, 1 988) .  This is known as the level 
effect. The second way is that human capital is the source of the technical progress through 
educational formation which facilitates the innovation (i .e .  Romer, 1 990;  Aghion & 
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Howitt, 1 992;  and Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008) as well as the diffusion and the 
adoption of new technologies (i . e .  Nelson and Phelps,  1 966) .  In fact, in this way the level 
of human capital has an impact on productivity growth and this is referred to as the rate 
effect (Maria, 2001 . )  Additionally, human capital can be seen as an engine of attracting 
other factors of production such as physical capital which makes a great deal to income per 
capita growth (i .e .  Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994). However, studies, such as Kyriacou 
(1991 )  and Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) have reported that the effects of human capital on 
economic growth are not significantly different from zero . Furthermore, Benhabib and 
Spiegel took another step further by considering technological progress is a function of 
human capital . The result they reported was that human capital has a significant positive 
impact on growth. Thus, the empirical evidence indicates that human capital affects 
economic growth only through its technological progress but there is no clear evidence of 
the level effect (Maria, 2001 . )  
Our results confirm that human capital has positive effects on economic growth in 
low income and lower middle income economies .  However, human capital is not 
significantly associated with the growth in upper middle income economies except in the 
model that includes the one-year lag of overall governance, a deep investigation is needed 
to determine the reason behind such a behavior. A potential explanation of this 
insignificance could be that primary completion rate is not a good proxy for human capital 
for this level of income. 
While several empirical studies ( i .e .  Fayissa & Nsiah; 2010 ;  Vargas-Silva et al., 
2009) find a positive impact of remittances on economic growth, remittances received are 
found to have no impact on economic growth in both low income (except in the model that 
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includes one-year lag of overall governance, remittances appear to be positively associated 
with economic growth. A result that needs further investigation) and lower middle income 
economies. This results are similar to the one found by Barajas et al. (2009) . The authors 
argue that there are countries received remittances exceed 1 0% of their GDP for a long­
time period, but no country can claim that remittances received have helped in boosting its 
economic growth. Part of the reason why remittances appear to have no effects on 
economic growth is that generally remittances are not used in investments, but rather are 
used as social insurance to alleviate the severity of poverty in these countries .  
In upper middle income economies, our results suggest that remittances affect 
economic growth negatively. Several studies, such as Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah 
(2003) ; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) ;  Karagoz (2009), have found similar results . 
A potential inference could be that remittances do not serve as capital for economic 
development, but rather serve as "compensation for poor economic performance . "  
Moreover, remittances could be  used as  a substitute of  labor income. If so ,  they will have 
an adverse effect on economic performance of recipient countries .  In fact, remittances used 
as substitute of labor income would decrease the labor supply and labor market 
participation (Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah, 2003), develop conspicuous consumption 
patterns,  and prevent the development of a culture of saving that can enable future 
investments and growth, all of which may have an adverse effect on economic activities in 
these economies. Additionally, remittances can affect economic growth through the 
channel of exchange rate by increasing the price of domestic goods . Indeed, it has been 
argued that remittances can raise the consumption of non-tradeable goods and therefore the 
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price of domestically produced goods, lower exports, and as result hurt a country' s  
competitiveness in world market (Amuedo-Dorantes, & Pozo, 2004) 
Despite the fact that foreign direct investment (net inflows) is expected to promote 
economic growth of host countries as several studies,  such as Blomstrom et al . ,  ( 1 994) ; 
Borensztein et al . ,  ( 1 998) ;  Liu et al . ,  (2002) ;  Alfaro et al . ,  (2004);  Blonigen and Wang, 
(2005) ;  Kottaridi, (2005) ;  and Yao, (2006) (Wang, 2009), have suggested that there is no 
consensus among scholars on the real effects of FDI on the growth of host economies .  
Indeed, some scholars, such as Borensztein et al .  (1998) ,  argue that FDI can promote 
economic growth only when "the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human 
capital" .  In other words, FDI boost the growth only if the host economy has a "sufficient 
absorptive capability of the advanced technologies ."  However, other scholars have found 
little to no evidence of FDI promoting economic growth. For instance, while Chakraborty 
and Basu ' s  (2002) study uses Granger causality test and suggests that FDI does not cause 
growth in India, the studies of Choe (2003), Choi (2004), and Carkovic & Levine (2005) 
argue that high levels of economic growth that attract more FDI inflows. 
Our findings suggest that FDI is not associated with economic growth regardless 
of countries '  income level .  A potential explanation, as suggested by Boyd and Smith 
(1992),  could be the existence of trade, price, financial, and other distortions . 
In contrast to what is expected, trade openness is found to have a negative impact 
on economic growth in lower middle income economies,  while it has no effect on the 
growth of low and upper middle income economies .  This could be explained by the fact 
that the maj ority of developing countries export mainly low elastic products (i . e . ,  raw 
materials) which are not affected by the degree of trade openness of a country. However, 
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these countries import high elastic products (i . e . ,  food) and therefore imports ' share 
dominates the exports' share . As a result, trade openness could be harmful to growth. 
While some pessimist scholars contend that high population growth rates may 
decrease public and private capital formation, create pressures on limited natural resources, 
and divert "additions to capital resources to maintaining rather than increasing the stock of 
capital per worker" (Easterlin, 1967) . Some optimistic researchers point out the positive 
impacts of high population growth rates such as "economies of scale and specialization, 
the possible spur to favorable motivation caused by increased dependency, and the more 
favorable attitudes,  capacities, and motivations of younger populations compared with 
older ones" (Easterlin, 1967) . Our outcomes indicate that population growth has no effect 
on economic growth in developing countries .  A potential inference could be that the 
progress in healthcare as well as the increase in life expectancy of population in developing 
countries make population growth not important as technological progress .  
According to the definition of good governance, we can consider it as a set of 
effective institutions and sound policies which may not have direct effects on economic 
growth. We therefore use economic literature and economic rationality to check for the 
different channels through which governance can impact economic growth. In this sense, 
it is generally argued that good governance has a positive impact on investment and FDI. 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (20 1 2) studied the effects of governance on private 
and foreign direct investment in 46 developing countries, their findings suggest that total 
investment (both FDI and private) is higher in countries with better governance .  In fact, 
the impacts of good governance on private sector activities are crucial in determining the 
levels of private investment and the nature of that investment. For instance, several studies 
so 
have pointed out corruption as distinctive factor to private investment. In developing 
countries, corruption has been designated as the leading constraint in doing business by a 
global survey of private business .  In this sense, Africa is ranked as the region the most 
corrupt (Mucavel, 2003) .  We therefore check whether governance affects the growth 
through the channels of investment and FDI.  
Furthermore, since early 1 990 ' s  many countries have implemented different trade 
liberalization policies to attract more volumes of FD I .  Studies, such as Al-Marhubi (2005) 
and Borrmann et al. (2007), have suggested that good governance and the quality of 
institutions are crucially important for a successful trade liberalization. Thus, we consider 
trade openness as a third channel through which governance could affect economic growth 
in developing countries .  
Tables 5 .4,  5 . 5 ,  and 5 .6 below depict the channels through which governance may 
impact the growth of low income economies, lower middle income, and upper middle 
income economies, respectively. 
First, our results indicate that governance does not affect the growth through the 
channel of investment in both low middle income and lower middle income economies .  
We can explain this by the fact that what affects private investments the most within a 
country is the profitability of these investments. In other words,  a country' s  citizens would 
invest if they were sure they would make a profit from their investments regardless of the 
quality of the governance in their country. However, when there are complicated 
regulations and obstacles, such as corruption, to start a business within a country, this may 
affect private investment negatively in that country. Moreover, as shown by Morrissey 
and Udomkerdmongkol (2012)  study, we can suggest that the lack of governance, from 
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which developing countries suffer in general, causes a hindrance in promoting the growth 
through the channel of investments. 
For upper middle income economies, our results are consistent with the findings of 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) .  In other words, governance affects positively 
economic growth of these economies through the channel of investment. Moreover, our 
outcomes reveal that the threshold at which governance will have no effect on the growth 
through investment is when the latter equals to 52 .09% of GDP . When investment passes 
this threshold, governance may have an adverse effect on economic growth within these 
economies. 
Second, Meon and Sekkat (2007) studied the effect of governance on FDI.  Their 
findings suggest that good governance has a positive impact on the FDI to GDP ratio but 
weaker than what is usually assumed. However, they argue that it should not be concluded 
that governance does not matter just because the effect of good governance on FDI inflows 
might seem weak, it stil l  crucially affects economic growth as studies frequently have 
shown. 
Table 5 .4 :  Governance, Economic Growth, and the Transmission Channels in Low 
Income Economies 
Overall Governance 
Government Expenditure 
Investment 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
0 . 1 64* * *  0 . 0647 0 . 1 64** *  0 .043 5 
(0 .0528)  (0. 1 20) (0 .0570) (0. 1 05)  
0 .00 1 03 0 .00 1 5 1  -0 . 000727 0 .00 1 27 
(0 .00554) (0 .00564) (0 .00564) (0.00559) 
0 .003 5 1 * 0 .00656* *  0 .0023 7  0 .003 3 8 * 
(0 .00 1 79) (0.00324) (0 .00 1 78) (0 .00 1 77) 
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Human Capital 0 .00595 * * *  0 . 00605 * * *  0 .006 1 0* * *  0 .006 1 4* * *  
(0 .00 1 53 )  (0 .00 1 53 )  (0 .00 1 48)  (0 .00 1 68)  
Remittances 0 .00309 0 .003 52  0 .00286 0 .00 1 3 3 
(0 .00279) (0.00278)  (0 .003 1 4) (0.00407) 
Governance* Investment 0 .0053 3  
(0 .00555 )  
FDI 0 .00520* *  
(0 .00265) 
Governance* FD I 0 .005 1 3 * 
(0 .003 00) 
Trade Openness 0 .00 1 3 7 
(0.00 1 50) 
Governance*Trade Openness 0 .00202 
(0 .00 1 5 8)  
Constant 5 . 500* * *  5 .425 * * *  5 . 5 3 3 * * *  5 .423 * * *  
(0. 1 24) (0. 1 59) (0 . 1 23 )  (0. 1 45)  
R2 0 . 5 1 9  0 . 524 0 . 5 36  0 . 5 33  
Chi2 1 00 .9  1 5 5 .4 1 3 3 . 1 94.97 
Observations 1 89 1 89 1 8 8 1 8 8 
Note : Model is based on Random Effect C luster method and R squared with in . Moreover, *= 1 0% 
significance;  * *=5% significance; * * *= 1 % significance . Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
below the estimated coefficients . 
Table 5 . 5 :  Governance, Economic Growth, and the Transmission Channels in Lower 
Middle Income Economies 
Overall Governance 
Government Expenditure 
Investment 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
0 . 3 37* * *  0 .277* *  0 . 320* * *  0 .430* * *  
(0 .0980) (0 . 1 29) (0 . 1 0 1 )  (0 . 1 5 1 ) 
0 .00468 0 .00445 0 .0044 1 0 .00554 
(0 .003 76) (0 .003 84) (0 .003 73)  (0 .003 5 8) 
0 .00748 * * *  0 .0086 1 * * *  0 .0073 1 * * *  0 .0084 1 * * *  
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(0 .002 1 2) (0 .00294) (0.002 1 5) (0 .00235)  
Human Capital 0 .00777** *  0 . 00764** *  0 .00770* * *  0 .00748 ** *  
(0 .00 1 28) (0 .00 1 3 3 )  (0 .00 1 26) (0 .00 1 3 8) 
Remittances 0 .0022 1 0 .00249 0 .00206 0 .00322 
(0.00362) (0.003 88)  (0.00367) (0.00273 )  
Governance* Investment 0 .00279 
(0.00430) 
FDI 0 .00470 
(0.00439) 
Governance* FD I 0 .00477 
(0 .00453 )  
Trade Openness -0 .00226 
(0 .00 1 56) 
Governance*Trade Openness -0 .00 1 25 
(0.00 1 52) 
Constant 6 .287** *  6 .27 1 * * *  6 .286* * *  6 .457** *  
(0. 1 49) (0. 1 53 )  (0. 1 47) (0. 1 99) 
R2 0.477 0 .479 0 .479 0.497 
F 20.49** *  1 6 .44** *  1 7 .49* * *  1 4 .90** *  
Observations 326 326 326 323 
Note : Model i s  based o n  F ixed Effect Cluster method and R squared within .  Moreover, *= 10% 
s ign ificance; * *=5% s ign ificance; * * *= 1  % s ign ificance . Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
below the estimated coefficients . 
Table 5 . 6 :  Governance, Economic Growth, and the Transmission Channels in Upper 
Middle Income Economies 
Overall Governance 
Government Expenditure 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
0 . 3 1 7**  0 . 599** *  0 . 375 ** *  0 .603 * * *  
(0. 1 3 5 )  (0 .204) (0. 1 24) (0.2 1 1 )  
-0 .0 1 32 -0 .0 1 29 -0 .0 1 20 -0 .0 1 43 
(0. 0 1 1 8) (0 . 0 1 04) (0 . 0 1 08) (0 . 0 1 25)  
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Investment 0 .0 1 3 7** *  0 . 0 1 27** *  0 .0 1 40** *  0 . 0 1 3 5 * * *  
(0 .004 1 1 )  (0 .00349) (0 .004 1 0) (0 .00422) 
Human Capital 0 .00266 0 .0026 1 0 .00267 0 .0023 9  
(0 .00232) (0 .00235)  (0 .00243)  (0 .0023 5)  
Remittances -0 .0283 ** *  -0 .0279** *  -0 .0294** *  -0 .0286** *  
(0 .0098 1 )  (0 . 0 1 08) (0. 00902) (0. 00990) 
Governance* Investment -0. 0 1 1 5 * 
(0 .00698) 
FDI 0 .000 1 36 
(0 .003 82) 
Governance* FDI -0 .0 1 37 
(0 . 0 1 20) 
Trade Openness -0 .000 1 36 
(0 .00 1 44) 
Governance* Trade Openness -0. 00292 
(0.002 1 5) 
Constant 8 . 1 1 9* * *  8 . 1 43 * * *  8 . 1 0 1 * * *  8 . 1 93 * * *  
(0 .294) (0 .282) (0 .283)  (0 . 3 32) 
R2 0 . 360 0 . 3 80 0 . 3 70 0 . 3 75 
Chi2 46 . 1 83 * * *  54 .733 ** *  6 1 . 303 ** *  5 8 . 1 43 * * *  
Observations 268 268 268 268 
Note : Model  i s  based on Random Effect C luster method and R squared within.  Moreover, * = 1 0% 
s ignificance; * *=5% s ign ificance; * * *= 1  % s ignificance . Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
below the estimated coefficients . 
Furthermore, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) have shown that governance is the 
main factor that U. S investors take into account in choosing the host countries of their 
investment. That is ,  the existence or the lack of different elements of governance affects 
the attractiveness of a country to foreign direct investment. More specifically, the element 
that is related to governance and associated the most with foreign direct investment is 
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transparency. The opacity is notion that is related to corruption and bribery which is a 
symptom of lack of governance (Kobeissi, 2005) . 
In addition, Dixit (2012) argues that the main factor that hampers FDI inflows to 
developing countries is the weak structures of governance .  As a result, FDI volume and 
investments form adapt to the quality of institutions and governance . Furthermore, the 
author contends that companies from countries with poor governance tend to invest in 
countries have similar quality of governance which can explain the outward FDI from 
developing countries .  
Our outcomes suggest that governance has a slight positive effect on economic 
growth in low income and upper middle income economies through the channel of FDI 
inflows . However, in lower middle income economies, governance does not affect the 
growth through this channel .  A potential inference might be the relatively low, on average, 
FDI that flows to the lower middle income economies compared to that, on average, flows 
to low income and upper middle income economies in our sample. 
Third, studies such as Acemoglu et al. (2003) ; Dollar and Kraay (2003) ; Addison 
& Baliamoune-Lutz (2006);  and Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana (2007) have argued 
that institutions are crucially important for the success of any economic reform in 
developing countries .  This evidence indicates that the quality of institutions is the main 
factor that handicaps trade reforms from attracting more FDI and promoting growth in 
developing countries .  Moreover, Addison & Baliamoune-Lutz's study (2006) on three 
North African countries suggest that the quality of institution is crucial to the growth effects 
of economic reforms. 
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As suggested by our findings, governance promotes economic growth through the 
channel of trade openness in lower middle income as well as upper middle income 
economies, but does not promote the growth of low income economies. This could be 
explained by the relatively poor governance, on average, of the low-income economies in 
our sample. 
Using the average of the six indicators of governance might be a limitation of our 
study because the relative weight of each indicator which might be different from a country 
to another as well as from a group of countries to another. We therefore introduce the six 
components of governance to our model to determine the crucial indicator that affects the 
growth the most for each group of countries .  
Tables 5 . 1 0, 5 . 1 1 , and 5 . 1 2  depict the relationship between the six indicators : voice 
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption, other economic growth determinants,  and economic growth. 
First, voice and accountability measures "political , civil and human rights" (khan, 
2007) . Improved public participation and democratic accountability can lead to lower 
levels of corruption, enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of public institutions, foster 
social trust and political stability, establish respect for the rule of law and property rights, 
extend investor protections restrict opportunistic and discretionary behavior, all of which 
promote an environment favorable to economic growth (Rodrik, 2000; Alesina, et al., 
1996;  Knack & Keefer, 1997; Feng, 1997; Henisz, 2004). In fact, evidence shows that 
the democratic interaction of citizens and state creates the incentives that lead, on average, 
to higher investments in health and education, and therefore lead to higher levels of human 
capital accumulation (Wacziarg et al., 200 1 ;  Baum et al., 2003) .  
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Furthermore, when political institutions properly represent the will ,  preferences, 
and interests of the citizens, and when these people recognize that they receive a sufficient 
supply of public goods, all of which refer to higher degrees of voice and accountability, 
they trust more their government as well as their identification with the state increases, 
which increase their willingness to contribute . If, on the other hand, political institutions 
do not represent the will of the citizens, citizens ' voice has the potential to restrict the 
power of the politicians. Moreover, it has been argued that policies that intend to improve 
voice and accountability can help to reduce the incentive to take economic activities 
underground (Torgler et al., 201 1 ) .  In addition, many studies have argued that shadow 
economy has an adverse effect on the long-term economic growth (Eilat & Zinnes, 2000) . 
Therefore, enhancing voice and accountability in developing countries may help to boost 
economic growth. 
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Table 5 . 7 :  Governance Indicators and Economic Growth in Low Income Economies 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Government Expenditure 0 .0008 8 1 0 . 00 1 2 1  0 .000852  0 .00 1 3 3  0 .00279 0 .00 1 3 1  
(0 .00562) (0 .00523)  (0 .00570) (0 . 00578)  (0 .00554) (0.00572) 
Investment 0 .00404* *  0 . 003 87***  0 .003 80* 0 .00390* *  0 .00323 * 0 .00394** 
(0 .00 1 68)  (0 .00 1 45 )  (0 .00 1 94) (0 .00 1 80) (0 .00 1 94) (0 .00 1 80) 
Human Capital 0 .00572* * *  0 .00590***  0 .00582** *  0 .00564** *  0 .00584***  0 .00575 *** 
(0 . 00 1 6 1 )  (0 .00 1 53 )  (0 .00 1 6 1 )  (0 .00 1 64) (0 .00 1 49) (0 .00 1 6 1 )  
Remittances 0 .00298 0 . 00 1 60 0 . 003 1 8  0 . 00265 0 .00403 0 .0027 1 
(0 .00323 )  (0 .003 1 8) (0 .00295) (0 .003 1 2) (0 .00256) (0.003 1 8) 
Voice & Accountability 0 .0876* *  
(0.0405) 
Politic Stability 0 .0643 * *  
(0 .0292) 
Government Effectiveness 0 .0828 
(0.0660) 
Regularity Quality 0 .05 84 
(0 .0840) 
Rule of  Law 0 . 1 7 1 * *  
(0 .0680) 
Control of Corruption 0 .0568 
(0 .0595) 
Constant 5 . 44 1 ** *  5 .427***  5 .458* * *  5 .430***  5 .494***  5 .423 *** 
(0 . 1 3 8) (0 . 1 20) (0 . 1 22) (0 . 1 29) (0 . 1 25)  (0. 1 28) 
R2 0.49 1 0 . 525  0 .483 0 .474 0 . 5 39  0 .480 
Chi2 98 . 5 5 ** *  79 .93 ** *  54 .22***  45 .05 * * *  65 .oo** *  49 . 5 8***  
Observations 1 89 1 89 1 89 1 89 1 89 1 89 
Note : Model is based on Random Effect Cluster method and R squared within.  Moreover, *= 10% s ignificance; * *=5% significance; * * *= 1  % 
s ignificance.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
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Table 5 . 8 :  Governance Indicators and Economic Growth in Lower Middle Income Economies 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Government Expenditure 0 .00720 0 .0077 1 0 .00552 0 .00477 0 .00659 0 .00564 
(0 .00524) (0 .005 1 7) (0 .0040 1 )  (0 .00346) (0.00465)  (0.004 1 1 ) 
Investment 0 .00792* * *  0 .00122* * *  0 .00885 * * *  0 . 009 1 6* * *  0 .00865 * * *  0 .00809** *  
(0 .00260) (0 .00242) (0 .002 3 8) (0 .00 1 86) (0.002 1 2) (0.002 1 8) 
Human Capital 0 .00902* * *  0 .00902* * *  0 . 00829* * *  0 .00748* * *  0 .00897* * *  0 .00844** *  
(0 .00 1 5 3 )  (0 .00 1 45 )  (0 .00 1 4 1 )  (0 .00 1 28)  (0 .00 1 3 8) (0 .00 1 27) 
Remittances  0 .00 1 97 0 .00 1 89 0 .00 1 25 0 . 00 1 2 1  0 .00 1 84 0 .00282 
(0 .00399) (0 .003 5 8) (0 .003 86) (0 .00360) (0.004 1 5) (0.003 1 2) 
Voice & Accountability 0. 1 27 
(0.0897) 
Politic Stability 0 .0753 * 
(0 .04 1 7) 
Government Effectiveness 0 .221··· 
(0 .08 1 0) 
Regularity Quality 0 . 1 82* *  
(0 .0676) 
Rule of Law 0 . 1 32 
(0. 1 1 4) 
Control of Corruption 0 .223 * * *  
(0 .0594) 
Constant 6 .0 1 4* * *  6 .0 1 5 * * *  6 . 1 45 * * *  6 . 1 93 * * *  6 .032* * *  6 . 1 42* * *  
(0. 1 7 1 )  (0 . 1 4 1 )  (0 . 1 5 0) (0 . 1 32) (0 . 1 40) (0. 1 39) 
R2 __
_
_ 
0.403 0.403 0 .450 0 .459 0 .406 0 .47 1 
F 1 3 .2 1 * * *  1 6 .27* * *  1 5 .96* * *  1 9 . 1 4* * *  1 5 . 84* * *  1 6 .4 1 * * *  
Observations 326 326  326 3 26 326  326  
Note : Model is  based o n  Fixed Effect Cluster method and R squared within.  Moreover, * = 10% s ignificance; * *=5% significance; * * *= 1  % 
s ignificance.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
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Table 5 .9 :  Governance Indicators and Economic Growth in Upper Middle Income Economies 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Government Expenditure -0 .0 1 2 1  -0 .00972 -0 .0 1 29 -0 .00634 -0 .00966 -0. 0 1 26 
(0 .0 1 26) (0 . 0 1 27) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 . 0 1 22) (0 .0 1 1 2)  (0 . 0 1 24) 
Investment 0 .0 1 45 * * *  0 .0 1 52* * *  0 . 0 1 45 * * *  0 . 0 1 30 * * *  0 . 0 1 49 * * *  0 .0 1 44 * * *  
(0 .00436) (0 .00448)  (0 .00405) (0 .00393)  (0 .0042 1 )  (0.00439) 
Human Capital 0 .00292 0 . 003 0 1  0 .00207 0 .00308  0 .0025 8 0 .00286 
(0 .00236) (0 .00232) (0 .00 1 92) (0 .00226) (0 .00224) (0.00232) 
Remittances -0 .03 1 0* * *  -0 . 03 1 5 * * *  -0 . 025 5 * * *  -0 . 0267* * *  -0 . 0302 * * *  -0 .0305 * * *  
(0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .00975) (0 .009 1 5) (0 .00982) (0.0 1 1 6) 
Voice & Accountability 0 . 1 1 9* *  
(0 .0566) 
Politic Stability -0 .0470 
(0 .0480) 
Government Effectiveness 0 . 3 1 5 * * * 
(0.0926) 
Regularity Quality 0 . 3 0 1  * * *  
(0 . 1 00) 
Rule of  Law 0.260* *  
(0 . 1 3 0) 
Control of Corruption 0 . 1 1 5 
(0. 1 08) 
Constant 8 . 047* * *  7 .989* * *  8 . 1 3 5 * * *  7 .942* * *  8 .083 * * *  8 .083 *** 
(0 . 3 1 0) (0 . 3 1 8) (0 .269) (0 .293)  (0 .306) (0 . 303)  
R2 0 .325  0 . 3 30  0 . 394 0 .4 1 7  0 . 3 66 0 .328 
Chi2 46 .05 * * *  46 .86* * *  60 . 8 1 * * *  63 .48* * *  4 1 .00* * *  37 .48***  
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 
Note : Model i s  based on Random Effect Cluster method and R squared within.  Moreover, *= 10% s ignificance; * *=5% s ignificance; * * *= 1  % 
s ignificance .  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients . 
6 1  
Our results show that voice and accountability metric is positively associated with 
economic growth in low income and upper middle income economies. However, they have 
no effect on economic growth in lower middle income countries .  
Second, political instability, which measures "the likelihood of violent threats to , 
or changes in, government" (khan, 2007), including terrorism, has been seen by 
economists as one of the serious harmful malaises that have an adverse effect on economic 
performance through a wide range of macroeconomic variables including, among others, 
GDP growth, private investment, and inflation. Moreover, political instability may 
"shorten policymakers ' horizons leading to suboptimal short term macroeconomic policies . 
It may also lead to a more frequent switch of policies, creating volatility and thus, 
negatively affecting macroeconomic performance (Aisen & Veiga, 2013 . )  
Many studies have been conducted to  identify the effects of political instability on 
different economic variables. For instance, Alesina et  al. (1996) studied 1 1 3 countries for 
the time span 1 950- 1 982 and showed that GDP growth is significantly lower in countries 
and time periods with a high tendency of government collapse. Recently, Jong-aPin ' s  
(2009) study also shows that higher degrees of  political instability are associated with lower 
economic growth. Moreover, the findings of Alesina and Perotti ' s  (1996) study suggest 
that socio-political instability creates an uncertain politico-economic environment, which 
raises risks, lowers investment and, consequently, adversely affects physical capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, as shown by Aisen and Veiga (2006), political instability leads 
to higher inflation rates,  shortens the horizons of governments, disrupts long-term 
economic policies that may lead to a better economic performance (Aisen & Veiga, 2013 . )  
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Our results suggest that political stability is positively associated with economic 
growth of low income and lower middle income economies. However, it is not associated 
with economic growth of upper middle income economies .  A potential explanation of these 
results could be that political stability does not guarantee higher growth rates .  In fact, there 
are a number of African countries that do not typically make it on to the list of high­
performers , that however have remarkably higher levels of political stability. Indeed, 
military dictatorships are stable, but that does not ensure higher growth rates .  For instance, 
since 1 994 the Gambia is controlled by the President Jammeh and continues to be as 
impoverished as ever (Shepherd, 2010) .  
Third, i t  has been argued that effective governments, which measures "the 
competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery" (khan, 2007), 
tend to attract more investment, attain higher levels of human capital accumulation, obtain 
better credit ratings, offer higher quality public services, make a better use of foreign aid 
resources as well as government spending, accelerate technological innovation, all of 
which lead to higher levels of economic growth (Burnside & Dollar, 1997;  Burnside& 
Dollar, 2000; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002). Moreover, poverty can be reduced by the 
efficiency in the delivery of public services (Leautier, 2006; Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, 
2002 ; Chong & Calderon, 2000) which may alleviate the severity of income inequality 
which is believed to have an adverse effect on economic growth. Furthermore, studies such 
as Lewis (2006) and Baldacci et al. (2004) have shown that "countries with more effective 
governments have more efficient health care and better educational systems ."  In addition, 
countries with better civil services tend to have lower levels of corruption (Rauch, 2001 .) 
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Our results show that government effectiveness is highly positively associated with 
economic growth of lower middle income and upper middle income economies .  
Nevertheless, government effectiveness has no effect on economic growth in low income 
countries .  An explanation of this could be the relatively low levels, on average, of 
government effectiveness in low income economies. 
Fourth, regulatory quality measures "the incidence of market-unfriendly policies" 
(khan, 2007) .  Good regulatory policies can help in boosting economic growth by reducing 
levels of poverty, creating opportunities for entrepreneurship, improving the quality of 
public services, reducing levels of corruption, and by enhancing the functioning of the 
service, housing, and labor markets on which they rely (Alesina, et al., 2005, Pages-Serra 
& Heckman, 2000 ; Johnson, Kaufmann & Zoido-Lobaton, 1998;  Ades & Tella, 1997; 
Fisman & Wei, 2004; Dj ankov, et al., 2002 ; Larsson, 2006.) Moreover, better regulatory 
quality can promote the growth by generating effective and efficient incentives for the 
private sector. Conversely, weaker regulatory policies affect economic performance 
negatively through economic waste and decreased productivity (Johnson, Kaufmann & 
Zoido-Lobaton, 1998;  Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Dollar, et al., 2004; Ades& Di Tella, 1999; 
Friedman, et al. , 2000 .) 
Our findings indicate that regulatory quality indicator is strongly positively 
correlated with economic growth in lower middle income and upper middle income 
countries .  Yet, regulatory quality is not associated with the economic performance of low 
income economies which could be explained by the low levels of regulatory quality, on 
average, in low income economies. 
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Fifth, rule of law measures "the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence" (khan, 2007). The judicial 
independence is highly associated with economic growth as it encourages a stable 
investment environment (Henisz, 2000; Feld & Voigt, 2003.) In fact, business 
environments that are characterized by sound policies and reliable rules including, secure 
property rights and contract enforceability, generates higher levels of investment and 
therefore boost the growth (Brunetti, et al., 1998 ; Rigobon & Rodrik, 2005 ; Rodrik, et 
al., 2004; Clague, et al. , 1999.) Furthermore, enforce contracts and secure property rights 
reduce poverty (Chong & Calderon, 2000; Dollar & Kraay, 2002) which means that more 
people will have access to better healthcare and education which have a positive impact on 
economic growth. 
Our outcomes show that rule of law metric is strongly positively affects economic 
growth in low income and upper middle income economies, which is a result that was 
reported by many previous studies (i .e .  Knack & Keefer, 1995;  Scully, 1988;  Barro, 
1996; Clague et al. 1996, 1999; Zak & Knack 200 1 ;  Keefer & Knack 2002 ; Keefer 
2007; Asoni 2008) However, it is not associated with economic growth of lower middle 
income countries, the same result was found by Przeworski et al . (2000 . )  Such a result can 
be explained by relatively high levels, on average,  of corruption in lower middle income 
economies. In fact, a weak rule of law is associated with high levels of corruption 
(Mendon�a & Fonseca, 2012.) 
Finally, control of corruption measures "the exercise of public power for private 
gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture" (khan, 2007). While 
many studies have pointed out the negative effects of corruption; for instance, corruption 
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leads to higher costs, lowers productivity, discourages private investment by reducing its 
profitability and increasing uncertainty as well as investment in health and education, limits 
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, weakens system of public 
financial management, reduces confidence in public institutions, retards human 
development, and creates a biased tax system that impacts income distribution (Ak�ay, 
2006; Gupta et al . , 2002 ; Lambsdorff, 2003 ; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004; Friedman, et 
al . ,  2000; Johnson, et al . ,  2000; Anderson, et al . ,  2004). 
Some other scholars, such as Leff ( 1 964) and Huntington ( 1 968) contend that 
corruption could be considered as a suitable substitute of rule of law (Houston, 2007). 
Furthermore, Osterfeld (1992) makes the difference between two categories of corruption: 
economically restrictive and economically expansionary. On the one hand, Corruption 
might be restrictive to the economy in terms of rent-seeking actions such as the action of 
firms seeking government protection from competitors . On the other hand, corruption 
could expand be economically expansionary when, for instance, citizens bribe officials to 
elude "bad law" (Houston, 2007) . 
Our results suggest that, on the one hand, control of corruption is highly positively 
correlated with economic growth in lower middle income economies .  On the other hand, 
control of corruption has no effect on the growth in low income and upper middle income 
countries .  The suggested insignificance of corruption could be explained by the fact that 
the large impact of corruption on economic growth is transmitter through different channels 
including investment, schooling, openness, and political violence, and their coefficient 
partially reflect the indirect impact of corruption on growth (Pellegrini, 201 1) 
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Chapter Six 
Concluding Remarks 
The research explores the impacts of governance and other growth determinants on 
economic growth in low-income, lower-middle income, upper middle income countries .  
The research has some important concluding remarks and policy recommendations . 
Low Income Economies 
Governance can strongly explain economic growth of low-income economies. 
Therefore, policymakers should divert their attention to this factor. More specifically, 
policymakers should adopt policies that would make citizens ' voice heard and build a 
democratic accountability . Policies that would lead to more political stability and promote 
a better rule of law. In these economies, governance can generate the growth through FDI.  
Moreover, policymakers should focus on investment and human capital because these 
factors can accelerate economic growth of low-income economies. However, government 
expenditure, personal remittances, FDI, trade openness, and population growth are not 
associated with the growth in low income countries .  
Lower Middle Income Economies 
Governance, investment, and human capital are positively and significantly related 
to economic growth of lower middle-income economies. Therefore, policymakers should 
divert their attention to these mechanisms, especially governance as it is the most important 
element of economic growth. In fact, policymakers should implement sound policies and 
regulations that will lead to less violence and more political stability, allow and promote 
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private sector development, and that will promote the rule of law which implies that every 
citizen is subj ect to the law, including law-makers themselves .  Moreover, governance can 
generate more income in these economies through trade openness which is found to have 
little negative to no effect on economic growth. In addition, government expenditure, 
personal remittances, FDI, and population growth are found to have no effect on economic 
growth. 
Upper Middle Income Economies 
Governance and investment have a positive impact on economic growth of upper 
middle income economies.  Therefore, policymakers should divert their attention to these 
mechanisms, especially governance as it is the most crucial element of economic growth. 
Indeed, policymakers should formulate and put into practice rigorous policies that will 
permit citizens to select their government, promote freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and free media. Policies that will enhance the quality of public services delivery 
and that will permit and insure private sector development. Furthermore, governance can 
generate economic growth in these economies through investment, FDI, and trade 
openness .  In addition, government expenditure, FDI, and population growth are found to 
be uncorrelated with economic growth. Conversely, personal remittances are found to have 
an adverse effect on economic growth in upper middle income countries .  
The concluding remarks are subj ect to a number of limitations . First, this paper 
studies samples of developing countries divided based on their income. Therefore, the 
results might contradict with other studies if other researchers include in their sample 
countries from different income groups.  
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Second, governance indicators are subject to many drawbacks . As argued by 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2007), all governance indicators have weaknesses because there 
is no easy way of measuring governance, and that the links between governance and 
economic outcomes are more complexed. Moreover, the maj or critiques of the worldwide 
governance indicators (WGI) are noted by Arndt and Oman (2006), Knack (2006), Kurtz 
and Shrank (2006), and Thomas (2006) .  These critiques address three main areas : First, the 
aggregation methodology which refers "to the difficulty for making reliable comparisons 
of governance over time and across countries . "  Then, "the independence of the assessments 
of governance provided by WGI ' s  different data sources as well as access to that data." 
Final ly, "WGI are influenced by the level of development of a country" which biases the 
individual indicators (Apaza, 2009 .)  
Third, some variables do not show their effect when the countries are far away from 
their steady state . Since each has its own economic characteristics ,  the policy 
recommendations should be used cautiously. 
Since governance and its metrics seem to mean a great deal to economic growth of 
developing countries regardless of their level of income, future studies should focus on 
exploring the main variable that affect governance. 
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Figure 1 :  Correlation between Real GDP and Governance Indicators in  Low Income Countries 
-2 
• • • 
.. � -'* 
• . � ·� .. 
. r.�· . . �· 
��· .. • •  • • .. , • • *.!� 
.... · . iT .. ·" • • 
+I .... ,. 
-1 . 5 -1 -.5 
VA 
0 .5 
I • lmealgdp --- Fitted va l u1s 
� •'\ 
�� • 
.. .  
• • • 
-.2 -1 .5 -1 -_5 
RQ 
0 
I • !n realgd p  --- F itted valu+s 
� 
<O 
<O 
� 
lO 
LO 
� 
<O 
(0 
LO 
lO 
lO 
-3 
• 
#
��· 
• 
. 
t.' -
. " 
..
_ .,  :t. _,/"' ···�· • • -9'.
· • .  
. 
. ... 
� .� ,� . 
. : r 
·s � 
• • -.> • 
-2 -1 
PS 
0 1 
I • l n realgdp --- F it ed valufs 
-2 
'.'! • .,,,. -'�·· 
. . � ·= � · .,�· · • • • • � Jr,. • •  ·:�� • i •• • • • • • • • ·i • • • • - . ...  
-1 . 5 - 1 
RL 
- .5 0 
I • l.nrea lgd p --- F it ed varu+s 
� 
(0 
<O 
� 
IO 
<n 
IO 
<O 
<O 
l.O 
lO 
·� . 
-2 -1 . 5  
.. 
-1 
GE 
• 
-
. 5 0 
I • l n real'gdp --- F it ed va1uqs 
,:.� ·
� 
. . � · � -���·, \,-... . . '"'·:>:'! • 
lO -l .. 4\. 
• 
-1 . 5  - 1  __ 5, 0 _5 1 
cc 
I · l n realg d p  --- F itted valm�s 
80 
<D 
� 
r-
r-
� 
<O 
<O 
� 
IO 
<D 
� 
r-
r-
II') 
co 
(lO 
� 
IO 
Figure 2 :  Correlation between Real GDP and Governance Indicators in Lower Middle Income Countries 
-2 -1 0 1 
VA 
I • Lnrealgdp --- Fitted v�1-uts 
-1 .5 -1 -_5 0 
RQ 
_5 1 
I •  Lnrealgdp --- Fitt�d valufs 
<D 
IO 
r-
r-
fO 
<O 
<O 
IO 
II") 
ro 
IO 
r-
r-
IO 
co 
co 
lO 
I,() 
• 
' 
-3 -2 -1 
PS 
0 1 
I • Lnrealgdp --- F itted valufs 
-1 . 5  -1 - _5 0 _ 5  
RL 
I • Lnreal'gdp --- Fitted val�rs 
<D 
� 
r-
r--
� 
<O 
<D 
� 
IO 
<D 
� 
r-
r-
IO 
co 
<O 
lO 
IO 
-1 . 5  - 1  -_5 0 
GE 
• 
_ 5  1 
I • Lnrealgdp --- Fit ed varufs 
' 
-2 -1 
� �  .. �-­�� . 
0 
cc 
It 
1 2 
I • Lnreal'gdpm--==- Fit ed varurs 
8 1  
CJ) -l 
:ri � 
CD -l 
� �  
,__ 
CJ) 
II") 
CD 
CD 
II") 
,__ 
,__ 
Figure 3 :  Correlation between Real GDP and Governance Indicators in Upper Middle Income Countries 
� 
.... ,
,..: �" 1- ·�· ·J.ff. 
� .. ·.4� .. 
i � ( I 
.. # • $ 
,,..
I 
-2 -1 0 1 
VA 
I • tn real'.gdp --- Fitted va 1 ufs 
... , . #:  
_,,...-
�; 
. ·� �· . ·�-
. 
-1 _ 5  -1 
• . -� ­
. . - -, ,; . ·.· 
., .,,..· • 
-_5 0 
RQ 
_ 5  1 
I • l'n rea!gdp --- Fit ed valu!s 
CJ) 
lO 
CD 
CD 
ll") 
,__ 
,__ 
CJ) 
I.{) 
00 
CD 
II") 
,__ 
,__ 
··� . • . • • 4 
.. ,. " • • • • 4'. • 
• .-
• • • • 
-2 
• 
• • 
-1 0 
PS 
1 
[•-l�rea lgdp --- Fit ed varu!s 
-1 -5 - 1 -_ 5 0 
RL 
• 
_5 1 
I • l n realgdp --- Fitted val�fs 
CJ) 
I.{) 
00 
00 
I.{) 
,__ 
,__ 
CJ) 
lO 
00 
00 
I.{) 
,__ 
,__ 
-1 -_ 5 
.. .  , 
-: . 
0 _5 
G E  
1 1 _ 5 
I • l n rea lgdp --- Fit ed vaJu4s 
• 
-2 -1 0 1 
cc I • l n realgdp --- Fit ed va1u*5 
82 
Table 1 :  Correlation Matrix of Low Income Economies 
VA PS GE RQ RL cc Gover. FDI Invest G.Exp Trade P .Grth Hum Remit 
VA 1 
PS  0 . 56  1 
GE 0 .46 0 .50 1 
RQ 0 . 37  0 . 56  0 . 84 1 
RL 0 . 62 0 .66 0 .78 0 . 74 1 
cc 0 .34  0 .4 1 0 .63 0 . 5 1 0 .66 1 
Govern. 0 . 72 0 .83  0 . 83  0 . 80  0 .9 1 0 .69 1 
- - -
FDI 0 . 1 1  0 .06 0 .06 0 .05  0 .03  0 .0 1 0 .02 1 
Invest 0 .25  0 . 1 0  0 .32  0 . 3 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 1 9  0 .28 0 .32 1 
Gov. 
Exp 0 .40 0 .05 0 . 1 4  0 . 02 0 .20 0 . 1 7  0 . 1 9  0 .03 0 .27 1 
Trade. 
Ope 0 .08  0 .0 1 0 . 37  0 . 3 1 0 . 33  0 .23 -0 .23 0 . 5 3  -0 .09 -0 .28 1 
Pop. 
Grth 0 . 3 1 0 .08 0 .05 0 .04 0 .20 0 .08 0 . 1 5  0 . 1 0  0 . 1 1  0 .46 -0. 1 1 1 
Hum. 
Cap 0 .28  0 .02 0 . 1 4  0 .03  0 . 1 2  0 .20 -0. 1 4  0 .07 0 .05 -0 .46 0 . 32  -0 .54 1 
- - -
Remit 0 . 1 0  0 .08 0 .23 0 . 1 4  0 .00 0 .0 1 -0. 1 2  0 . 1 4  0 .08  -0 .25 0 . 1 3  -0 .34 0 .43 1 
-----' 
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Table 2 :  Correlation Matrix of Lower Middle Income Economies 
VA PS GE RQ RL cc Gover. FDI Invest G.Exp Trade P .Grth Hum Remit 
VA 1 
PS  0 . 3 3  1 
GE 0 . 5 3  0.40 1 
RQ 0 .43  0 . 1 4  0 . 5 8  1 
RL 0 .48  0.49 0 .75  0 .40  1 
cc 0 . 54  0 .6 1 0 . 74 0 . 36  0 . 8 1 1 
Govern. 0 . 72 0 .72 0 . 83  0 . 57  0 . 84 0 . 8 8  1 
-
FDI 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 3  -0 .08 0 .0 1 -0 . 1 3  -0 .09 -0 . 0 1  1 
Invest 0 . 1 1  0 . 38  0 . 3 1 -0 .08 0 . 3 3  0 . 30  0 . 32  0 . 1 3  1 
Gov. 
Exp 0 . 1 5  0 .09 -0. 1 2  -0 . 1 4  0 .00 0 . 06 0 .03 0 .09 0 .32 1 
Trade . 
Ope 0 . 02 0 . 39  -0 .09 -0. 1 5  -0 .03 0 . 1 1  0 . 1 0  0 . 30  0 . 1 6  0 .4 1 1 
Pop. 
Grth 0 . 1 7  -0. 2 1  -0 .3 1 -0 .34 -0 . 1 1 -0 . 1 0  -0 .26 -0 .20 -0 .06 0 .02 -0 .23 1 
Hum. 
Cap 0 . 1 4  0 .09 0 .26 0 .27 0 .09 0 .03 0 . 1 8  0 . 1 5  0 . 1 0  -0 .02 -0 . 02 -0 .4 1 1 
Remit 0 . 04 0 .03 -0 .08 0 .09 -0 .08 -0 .07 -0 . 0 1 0 . 1 0  -0 .0 1 0 .24 0 .42 -0 . 1 8  0 . 1 1  1 
84 
Table 3 :  Correlation Matrix of Upper Middle Income Economies 
VA PS GE RQ RL cc Gover. FDI Invest G.Exp Trade P .Grth Hum Remit 
VA 1 
PS  0 . 39  1 
GE 0 .47 0 .34 1 
RQ 0 . 74 0 .24 0 .79 1 
RL 0 . 62 0 . 55  0 . 86  0 .77 1 
cc 0 .6 1 0 .56  0 .79 0 .66 0 .92 1 
Gover. 0 . 79 0 .66 0 .83  0 . 83  0 .94 0 .9 1 1 
FDI 0 .25  0 . 1 1  0 . 1 3  0 .23 0 .23 0 . 1 9  0 .23  1 
Invest -0 .24 0 . 1 7  -0 . 1 6  -0 . 1 7  -0 . 1 1 -0 .0 1 -0 . 1 0  0 .29 1 
Gov.Exp 0 . 1 2  0 . 35  0 .26 0 . 1 5  0.44 0 . 54  0 . 3 8 0 .08  0 .09 1 
Trade -0 .24 0 .2 1 0 . 1 9  -0 .06 0 . 1 4  0 .04 0 .05  0 .07 0 . 1 6  0 .09 1 
P .Grth -0 . 1 2  -0.25 0 . 1 9  0 .07 0 . 1 1  0 .02 -0 .02 -0 .07 -0 .27 -0 .08 0 .08 1 
Hum -0. 1 7  -0. 0 1  0 .05 -0 .05 0 .00 0 .06 -0 .03 0 .04 0 .05  0 .02 -0 .07 -0 . 1 3  1 
Remit -0 .08  -0. 37  -0. 1 4  -0 .04 -0 .08  -0 . 1 6  -0 . 1 9  0 . 39  0 .09 0 .02 -0 .02 0 .20 -0 .25 1 
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